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Ackerman, Robert K. (2003, October). “Intelligence: Horizontal Integration 
Challenges Intelligence Planner.” Signal, 29. 
 
The U.S. intelligence community is in a race against international adversaries, and 
to win, it must link diverse data systems and information processes so that experts 
can learn enemy intentions and plans before disaster strikes. This race toward 
horizontal integration of intelligence has a two-pronged thrust that encompasses 
both data exchange at the collection level and information exchange at various 
levels of command and civil government decision-making (Ackerman). 
 
Agrell, Wilhelm.  (2002). “When everything is intelligence – nothing is intelligence.”  
Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers, 1(4). 
 
 Today, many intelligence analysts not only have an academic background, but 
also some kind of academic education or training in their specific field.  No one 
thinks it is a weird thing to give courses in intelligence and it’s applications in 
various fields. The limiting factor is hardly reluctance to attend courses but the 
availability of appropriate and sufficiently qualified lecturers, courses, or training 
programs.  If a modern profession is characterized by the transformation from 
improvisation and master-apprentice relations to formalized education and 
training programs, then intelligence analysis has come a long way. 
 
Aldrich, Richard J.  (2003). “Intelligence Test.”  Foreign Policy, 134: p. 98. 
 
Focuses on an article by Carmen A. Medina in 'Studies in Intelligence,' which 
asks whether the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) model of intelligence 
analysis is failing. Argument for a revolutionary overhaul; Implications of the 
growing availability of so-called open-source intelligence; Challenges to the 
CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI); Response to the article by DI officer 
Steven R. Ward; The slow pace of changes in U.S. intelligence.  
 
Andre, Louis E.  (1997). “Intelligence Production: Towards a Knowledge-Based 
Future.” Defense Intelligence Journal, 6(2): 33-45. 
 
To be prepared to participate in the ongoing information revolution, the 
intelligence production community needs to make a "concerted effort to find 
dramatically better ways to capture and distribute digitally the extraordinary and 
dynamic base of knowledge resident in our analytic corps." (Abstract from 
http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/D_folder/defij_analysis.html) 
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Armstrong, Fulton T.  (2002).  “Ways to Make Analysis Relevant But Not 
Prescriptive.”  Studies in Intelligence, Unclassified Edition, 46(3): 37-43. 
 
 In confronting the intelligence/policy divide that analysts are expected to observe, 
this author describes the conundrums that intelligence professionals face as they 
attempt to provide analyses that are policy neutral yet attuned to policymaker 
interests.  To better navigate these choppy waters, the author finds solutions in 
commitment to rigorous standards of alternative-analysis and avoidance of value 
judgments while simultaneously consulting outside sources to stay in touch with 
the Beltway agenda. 
 
Barger, Deborah. (2005).“Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs.” Rand 
Corporation, 
Technical Report.  Retrieved from 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR242.pdf  
 
As the global war on terrorism continues to expand and the post-Cold War 
security environment remains in flux, both the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. 
intelligence have been thrust into the public spotlight. The author advances the 
argument that a “Revolution in Intelligence Affairs” is needed to prepare the 
Intelligence Community to meet its future challenges. In this report, she presents a 
framework for how the United States should consider specific changes to its 
intelligence enterprise to improve its effectiveness. 
 
Barger, Deborah. (2004). “It is Time to Transform, Not Reform, U.S. Intelligence.” 
SAIS Review, 24(1). 
 
Intelligence reform has traditionally been the purview of those outside of the 
Intelligence Community. Many insiders would argue that intelligence reform 
efforts have resulted in more regulation and bureaucracy and little, if any, 
improvement in intelligence performance. To address the challenges that the 
United States will face in the future, it needs to look forward to transforming 
intelligence, not backwards at reforming it. The transformation of intelligence, 
however, will require a three-way partnership among external catalysts who bring 
new ideas to the table, legislative overseers who support new ideas through 
funding and legislation, and internal supporters who evaluate and then implement 
change (Barger). 
 
Berkowitz, Bruce.  (1996).  “Information Age Intelligence.”  Foreign Policy, 103: p. 
135. 
 
Comments on the need to reform intelligence services in the United States. Role 
of information technology advances in the need to reform intelligence services; 
Areas needing changes to improve service efficiency; Urgency for the intelligence 
community to assume the flexibility of corporations to changes. 
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Berkowitz, Bruce D. (1997). “Information Technology and Intelligence Reform.” 
Orbis, 41(1): 12-14.  
 
Many issues of intelligence reform primarily concern technology – in particular, 
information technology.  The intelligence community has become more 
dependent on technical systems for collecting, processing, and disseminating its 
intelligence.  At the same time, rapid improvements in technology are changing 
both the nature of information systems and how people use them.  It follows that 
any intelligence reform must include plans for the effective development, 
management, and organization of technology.  As the U.S. intelligence 
community prepares for the post-cold war era and the twenty-first century, 
Americans have the opportunity to rethink what they expect from intelligence and 
how they expect it to operate.  The one certainty is that technology will be central 
to any proposed reform, as the intelligence community, like the rest of society, 
moves into the Information Age (Berkowitz). 
 
Berkowitz, Bruce. (2001). "Better Ways to Fix Intelligence," Orbis, 45(4): 609-619. 
 
Despite the apparent consensus on the need for change, recent intelligence failures 
suggest that U.S. intelligence has yet to leave its Cold War-era methods and 
structure behind. All of this raises the questions of why it has been so hard to 
modernize American intelligence and what practical steps could ensure that 
needed reforms finally take hold. 
 
The challenge of intelligence reform is not how to make the intelligence 
bureaucracy work better, but rather how to make the intelligence community 
operate less like a bureaucracy. The measures required to achieve this bear little 
resemblance to traditional intelligence reforms.  Improving communications 
capacity, or bandwidth, is crucial to countering the data glut intelligence analysts 
face. The situation is only likely to get worse in the face of increasing interaction 
among producers and users of intelligence, the sharing of ever-larger data sets, 
and an expanding base of users and information sources. Communication links 
will themselves become a major constraint on change within the intelligence 
community. Investments in communications capacity may seem more like a 
logistical detail than a major policy reform, but they are utterly essential to 
improving intelligence operations (Berkowitz).  
 
Berkowitz, Bruce. (2003). “Failing to Keep Up With the Information Revolution.”  
Studies in Intelligence, 47(1). 
 
[The author] was a Scholar-in-Residence at the Sherman Kent Center for 
Intelligence Analysis, and was charged with looking at how the Directorate of 
Intelligence (DI) uses information technology (IT), and how it might use this 
technology more effectively.  
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DI analysts are easily a match for their counterparts elsewhere in the government 
or private sector in terms of knowledge and analytic skill.  [However], DI analysts 
know far less about new information technology and services than do their 
counterparts in the private sector and other government organizations.  Many 
analysts seem unaware of data that are available on the Internet and from other 
non-CIA sources.  Also, organizational, security, and technical obstacles keep DI 
analysts from easily communicating with other agencies.  Technology is no 
substitute for smart analysts, of course, but better technology—and better use of 
technology—could improve the DI’s efficiency and enable its analysts to be more 
responsive.  
 
Being able to redeploy analysts and form ad hoc teams quickly and effectively is 
a basic requirement for intelligence organizations today.  The DI needs to be more 
agile, and technology is part of the solution. The DI must use information tech-
nology more effectively if it hopes to provide US officials the intelligence that 
they require to detect, understand, and respond to current, emerging, and future 
threats facing the United States.  To meet this challenge, however, the DI must 
adjust its culture and make major changes in its current approach to information 
technology operations (Berkowitz). 
 
Berkowitz, Bruce. (2004). “Intelligence for the Homeland.”  SAIS Review 24(1). 
 
Two years after the September 11th attacks on America, a significant gap remains 
in our defenses against terrorists and other forms of foreign attack. The problem is 
that we still lack adequate homeland intelligence. As a result, we are still ill 
prepared to detect, analyze, and monitor foreign threats inside our borders (SAIS 
Review). 
 
Berkowitz, Bruce.  (2004, February 1).  “We Collected A Little, and Assumed a 
Lot.”  Washington Post, p. B01. 
 
Last week David Kay went to Capitol Hill to explain to lawmakers what he had 
found in Iraq. Until last month, Kay, a widely respected proliferation expert, 
headed the Iraqi Survey Group, the team assigned after the war to find Iraq's 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons -- and assess how well U.S. intelligence 
understood the threat. 
 
"It turns out we were all wrong, probably, in my judgment," Kay said at the 
hearing. "And that is most disturbing." 
 
Disturbing is right. What happened? U.S. intelligence analysts have been taking a 
lot of criticism lately, but I believe that, when all the investigations are completed, 
we will discover that this wasn't an intelligence analysis failure. It was mainly an 
intelligence collection failure, combined with a misunderstanding all around about 
how intelligence really works. 
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Berkowitz, Bruce and Allan Goodman. (2000). Best Truth:  Intelligence in the 
Information Age. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press. 
 
One would expect the best-funded intelligence service in the world to produce 
good results, but, unfortunately, the U.S. intelligence community continues to 
commit avoidable blunders. Intended as a provocative manifesto, this book calls 
for fundamental changes in the way that intelligence is collected, processed, and 
distributed by the U.S. government. Selected case studies are presented to 
illustrate problems and possible improvements. The authors call for more 
openness, a less hierarchical structure, and better cooperation with the private 
sector.  Continually evolving technological challenges will probably be overcome 
since this is what Americans do best, but it is hard to change a large bureaucracy 
with an entrenched worship of secrecy, unless it receives a giant, costly shock 
(e.g., the bombing of Pearl Harbor). The authors, who both started their careers at 
the CIA, previously collaborated on Strategic Intelligence for American National 
Security. 
 
Best, Richard. (2003). “Intelligence Issues for Congress.”  Congressional Research 
Service, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, August 2003. 
 
The U.S. Intelligence Community continues to adjust to the 21st century 
environment. Congressional and executive branch initiatives have emphasized 
improved cooperation among the different agencies that comprise the Community 
by giving greater coordination and managerial authority to the Director of Central 
Intelligence (DCI).  Priority continues to be placed on intelligence support to 
military operations and on involvement in efforts to combat transnational threats, 
especially international terrorism. Growing concerns about transnational threats 
are leading to increasingly close cooperation between intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies. This relationship is complicated, however, by differing 
roles and missions as well as different statutory charters.  
 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, for which no specific warning was 
provided, have led to increased emphasis on human intelligence, statutory 
changes permitting closer cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies, and to consideration of organizational changes to the Intelligence 
Community. Intelligence Community leadership and congressional committees 
have expressed determination to enhance analytical capabilities. A major concern 
is an imbalance between resources devoted to collection and those allocated to 
analysis, with collected data much exceeding analytical capabilities (Best). 
 
Best, Richard.  (2005). “The Director of National Intelligence and Intelligence 
Analysis.”  Congressional Research Service, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, 
February 2005). 
 
The 9/11 Commission made a number of recommendations to improve the quality 
of intelligence analysis. A key recommendation was the establishment of a 
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Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position to manage the national 
intelligence effort and serve as the principal intelligence adviser to the President 
— along with a separate director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
Subsequently, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 
P.L. 108-458, made the DNI the principal adviser to the President on intelligence 
and made the DNI responsible for coordinating communitywide intelligence 
estimates. Some observers note that separating the DNI from the analytical offices 
may complicate the overall analytical effort. 
 
Betts, Richard. (2002). “Fixing Intelligence.” Foreign Affairs, 81(1): 43-60. 
 
A lot will be done to shore up U.S. intelligence collection and analysis. Reforms 
that should have been made long ago will now go through. New ideas will get 
more attention and good ones will be adopted more readily than in normal times. 
There is no shortage of proposals and initiatives to shake the system up. There is, 
however, a shortage of perspective on the limitations that we can expect from 
improved performance. Some of the changes will substitute new problems for old 
ones. The only thing worse than business as usual would be naive assumptions 
about what reform can accomplish. 
 
The intelligence community has worked much better than [critics] assume. U.S. 
intelligence and associated services have generally done very well at protecting 
the country.  [However], even the best intelligence systems will have big failures.  
It will be some time before the real story of the September 11 intelligence failure 
is known.  At this point it is more appropriate to focus on the merits of proposals 
for reform and the larger question about what intelligence agencies can 
reasonably be expected to accomplish. 
 
Reforms that can be undertaken now will make the intelligence community a little 
better. Making it much better, however, will ultimately require revising 
educational norms and restoring the prestige of public service. Even if achieved, 
such fundamental reform would not bear fruit until far in the future. Better 
intelligence may give us several more big successes like those of the 1990s, but 
even a .900 average will eventually yield another big failure. That means that 
equal emphasis must go to measures for civil defense, medical readiness, and 
"consequence management," in order to blunt the effects of the attacks that do 
manage to get through. Efforts at prevention and preparation for their failure must 
go hand in hand (Betts). 
 
Betts, Richard K. (2004). “The New Politics of Intelligence: Will Reforms Work 
This Time?” Foreign Affairs 83(3): 2-9. 
 
The failure to prevent the attacks of September 11, 2001, the failure to find 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and the proliferation of official 
investigations trying to figure out what went wrong in both cases have combined 
to put intelligence issues in a very unusual position this year: at the center of a 
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closely contested presidential campaign.  All the attention creates both an 
opportunity and a danger.  The opportunity stems from the consensus that major 
reforms are necessary.  The danger stems from the gap between the urge to do 
something and the uncertainty about just what that something should be – as well 
as from the entanglement of intelligence and policy issues involved with the Iraq 
question in particular. 
 
At the end of the day, the strongest defense against intelligence mistakes will 
come less from any structural or procedural tweak than from the good sense, good 
character, and good mental habits of senior government officials (Betts).  
 
Bodnar, John W. (2003). Warning Analysis for the Information Age:  Rethinking the 
Intelligence Process.  Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 
Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. 
 
Changes in technology in the past half century have destroyed the ability to 
provide warning intelligence by traditional means. The changing tempo of the 
WMD and terrorist threats has virtually destroyed the ability to provide tactical or 
strategic warning.  
 
New methodologies for warning intelligence can be developed based on quantum 
thinking rather than Newtonian thinking. Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs) 
are precipitated by new developments in technology that ultimately change not 
only strategies and operations but organizations as well. Our current strategies and 
organizations are based on Industrial Age technologies built by Newtonian 
thinking. Strategies and organizations for the Information Age must be built on 
quantum thinking.  
 
This analysis also points toward the basis of a New Science based on quantum 
methods, which assume that the world is digital and multi-state. Data can be 
"massive" both in quantity and type. A major problem in exploiting the massive 
quantities available to the Intelligence Community is the lack of a historical 
baseline and a lack of librarians and curators to organize and tag the data for easy 
retrieval. This means that we must develop methods for rapid writing of classified 
history and for systematic data archiving. Collecting and analyzing massive 
amounts of data will not provide valid assessments unless the dimensionality of 
the data reflects the dimensionality of the problem. We need to analyze changes 
required in organizational structures to go from Industrial Age organizations for 
the Cold War to Information Age organizations needed to combat WMD and 
terrorism proliferation networks (Bodnar). 
 
Callum, Robert.  (2001).  “The Case for Cultural Diversity in the Intelligence 
Community.”  International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 
14(1): 25-48. 
 
Historically, the U.S. Intelligence Community has been a homogeneous 
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environment bereft of participation from different races and cultures. While the IC 
has made strides in recent years, the community is still overwhelmingly white and 
disproportionately male. This cultural homogeneity leads to predictable and 
preventable errors in analysis. These errors commonly fall under the rubric of 
``mirror-imaging’’: the fallacy that antagonists will think and act as ``we’’ would 
if ``we’’ were in their shoes. Arguably, greater diversity will lead to 
improvements in analysis by lessening the impact of shared, common biases. An 
analogy comes from the world of business, which has become increasingly 
diverse in response to the inherent unpredictability of international markets. 
 
Clark, Richard M.  (2003).  Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach.  
Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. 
 
Designed to give analysts and practitioners state-of-the-art, practical information 
and skills, Intelligence Analysis guides readers through the art of target modeling 
and organizational analysis, as well as quantitative and predictive techniques. 
Intelligence collectors, consumers, and analysts can and should work together to 
create and share a conceptual model of the intelligence target. Simply put, it's a 
smarter, more sensible way to collect, synthesize, and utilize intelligence. The 
author makes extensive use of real-world examples and cases and employs nearly 
100 graphic elements to illustrate the versatility and effectiveness of his 
methodology. 
 
Coffman, Thayne, Seth Greenblatt, and Sherry Marcus. (2004). “Graph-based 
Technologies for Intelligence Analyst.” Communications of the ACM, 47(3): 
45-47.  
 
For the past 20 years, the intelligence community’s focus was on improving 
intelligence collection at the cost of improving intelligence analysis. The problem 
today is often not a lack of information, but instead, information overload. 
Analysts lack tools to locate the relatively few bits of relevant information and 
tools to support reasoning over that information.  
 
Subgraph isomorphism and statistical classification via social network analysis 
(SNA) metrics are two important classes of techniques that operate on attributed 
relational graphs, a representation familiar to the intelligence problems: finding 
significant combinations of events in a deluge of information (Coffman, 
Greenblatt, and Marcus). 
 
Dalby, Simon.  (1995).  “Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global 
Environment.”  Intelligence and National Security, 10(3): 175-197. 
 
 The global environmental situation is obviously a matter of concern.  
Stratospheric ozone holes, global climate change, sea level changes, fish stock 
depletions, desertification, population change, deforestation, and many other 
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issues clearly affect the national interests of many states.  This important cluster 
of issues is now often described under the rubric of ‘environmental security’. 
 
 In exploring this dilemma of environmental security, this essay first surveys some 
of the large scale contemporary environmental challenges.  It then discusses the 
effects of environmental changes on international security.  It suggests that the 
Cold War assumptions are inappropriate to dealing with most environmental 
security issues.  The implications of rethinking security, including an expansive 
definition of the national interest and the global necessities of politics in a 
changing environment, are explored in later sections.  The conclusion offers some 
tentative suggestions for reformulating post-Cold War security agencies’ 
mandates and practices. 
 
Davis, Jack.  (1991).  “Combating Mind-Set: Improving the Quality of Analysis.”  
Studies in Intelligence (Unclassified Edition), 35(5). 
 
 When intelligence analysts cannot rely solely on factual evidence to address 
questions of concern to U.S. national security, they have to begin to employ 
judgment.  In effect, when we do not know, we estimate.  And when analysts 
estimate they depend on mind-set.  For the purpose of this article, mind-set is the 
distillation of the intelligence analyst’s cumulative factual and conceptual 
knowledge into a framework for making estimative judgments on a complex 
subject.  Case studies on Agency analytic performance indicate that analysts and 
managers alike do not pay their dues to this powerful phenomenon.  Analytic 
procedures and practices, herein called tradecraft, that do not ensure against or 
otherwise combat mind-set put the resultant assessments at high risk of either 
being wrong or being unread. 
 
Davis, Jack.  (1995).  “A Policymaker’s Perspective on Intelligence Analysis.”  
Studies in Intelligence (Unclassified Edition), 38(5). 
 
 This article is based on the author's interviews during 1991-93 of Ambassador 
Robert D. Blackwill. The original pillar of Ambassador Blackwill's doctrinal 
views on intelligence and policy was self-interest--his effort to make the 
relationship work for him personally under trying conditions. He served as 
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Soviet 
Affairs, National Security Council Staff, during 1989-90, a tumultuous period that 
witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reshaping of Europe. The more 
lasting pillar is his concern for the national interest--a belief that the United States 
can ill afford prevailing patterns of ineffective ties between experts on events 
overseas and policymakers in Washington. 
 
Davis, Jack.  (2002).  “Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning.”  
Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers, 1(1). 
 
9 
A host of reports have been written over the 50 years of CIA history evaluating 
analytic performance and recommending changes in priorities and tradecraft. 
These “post-mortem reports” have been issued by Agency leaders and 
components as well as by Congressional committees and commissions and non-
governmental organizations concerned about intelligence performance.  Starting 
with the 1990s, post-mortem reports increased in number, generated both by 
charges of specific intelligence failures and by general recognition that the post-
Cold War period presented new challenges to intelligence. 
 
The recent post-mortem reports have helped Directorate of Intelligence leaders to 
examine current doctrine and practice critically, and to address identified 
challenges in training programs. This Occasional Paper is one of a series of 
assessments of what recent critiques have said about the key challenges facing the 
DI in the new century. 
 
The present paper addresses the challenges of strategic warning.  It reviews five 
post-mortem critiques: (1) Douglas J. MacEachin, “Tradecraft of Analysis,” U.S. 
Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform (1995); (2) Adm. David 
Jeremiah (R), Intelligence Community’s Performance on the Indian Nuclear Tests 
(1998); (3) CIA, Office of Inspector General, Alternative Analysis in the 
Directorate of Intelligence (1999); (4) Report of the Commission to Assess the 
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (1998); (5) Working Group on 
Intelligence Reform of the National Strategy Information Center, The Future of 
US Intelligence (1996). 
 
Davis, Jack. (2002).  “Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysis and the 
Policymaking Process.”  Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, 
Occasional Papers, 1(2). 
 
The recent post-mortem reports have helped Directorate of Intelligence leaders to 
examine current doctrine and practice critically, and to address identified 
challenges in training programs.  This Occasional Paper is one of a series of 
assessments of what recent critiques have said about the key challenges facing the 
DI in the new century.  
The present paper addresses the challenge of establishing effective analyst-
policymaker relations.  It reviews five post-mortem critiques: (1) Twentieth 
Century Fund Task Force on the Future of Intelligence, In from the Cold (1996); 
(2) Independent Task Force of the Council on Foreign Relations, Making 
Intelligence Smarter:  The Future of U.S. Intelligence (1996); (3) Commission on 
the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, 
Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (1996); (4) 
Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United 
States (1998); (5) Working Group on Intelligence Reform of the National Strategy 
Information Center, The Future of US Intelligence (1996). 
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Davis, Jack.  (2002).  “Improving CIA Analytic Performance: DI Analytic 
Priorities.”  Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional 
Papers, 1(3). 
 
The recent post-mortem reports have helped Directorate of Intelligence leaders to 
examine current doctrine and practice critically, and to address identified 
challenges in training programs. This Occasional Paper is one of a series of 
assessments of what recent critiques have said about the key challenges facing the 
DI in the new century. 
The present paper addresses the challenge of establishing priorities among 
competing uses of analytic resources (for example, current trend reporting vs. 
customized “action” analysis vs. in-depth studies).  It reviews six post-mortem 
critiques: (1) Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of Intelligence, In 
from the Cold (1996); (2) Adm. David Jeremiah (R), Intelligence Community’s 
Performance on the Indian Nuclear Tests (1998); (3) Report of the Commission to 
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (1998); (4) Independent 
Task force of the Council on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter:  
The Future of U.S. Intelligence (1996); (5) Commission on the Roles and 
Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 21st 
Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (1996); (6) Staff Study, Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, IC21: Intelligence 
Community in the 21st Century (1996). 
 
Davis, Jack. (2003).  “If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?” Sherman 
Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers, 2(1). 
 
Strategic warning, to be effective, has to be credible in assessing contingent 
dangers and has to facilitate policymaker decision and action to protect against 
these dangers. This paper tables for consideration and debate several 
recommendations to advance two goals:  To reconstitute strategic warning as a 
collaborative governmental function by engaging policy officials responsible for 
effecting defensive measures in every step of the analysis process, including topic 
selection and trend monitoring, and to warrant a distinctive intelligence 
contribution to a collaborative warning effort by expanding dedicated analytic 
resources and sharpening requisite substantive expertise and specialized 
tradecraft. 
 
Davis, Jack.  (2003).  “Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts, 
and Evidence.” Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional 
Papers, 2(2). 
 
This paper has argued that policymaker criticism of DI analysis on hot-button 
issues is not an exceptional challenge but a largely normal clash of conflicting 
professional priorities between analysts and policymakers as two distinct national 
security tribes.  Below is an attempt to provide general tradecraft guidance for 
analysts based mainly on personal experience and research.  Because contentious 
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issues usually generate an expansion in requests for analytic deliverables and a 
compression of deadlines, managers are advised to invest in incremental 
development of identified analyst skills before sustained policymaker criticism 
strikes.  
 
The general message of these recommendations is that analysts should take the 
tradecraft elements of policymaker criticism seriously.  Analysts should enhance, 
first, understanding of the dynamics of national security policy making, second, 
their vulnerability to misperception and, third, their skills in remedial practices. 
The goal—by raising standards of practice—is to take tradecraft issues off the 
table, so to speak, in an effort to isolate and defuse any politically motivated 
elements. 
 
Dempsey, Michael P. and William C. Prillaman. (2004). “Mything the Point: What's 
Wrong with the Conventional Wisdom about the C.I.A.” Intelligence and 
National Security 19(1): 1-28. 
 
 This article examines seven myths about the Central Intelligence Agency. These 
misperceptions persist because of an inadequate understanding of the relationship 
between intelligence and policy, outdated stereotypes that ignore recent reforms, 
and the politics that accompany delivering bad news to senior officials. Scholars 
and intelligence officers looking to advance the debate on intelligence issues 
could usefully focus their research on several core dynamics: sharpening the 
distinction between intelligence failures and policy failures; deconstructing 
intelligence successes to determine whether those 'best practices' can be replicated 
elsewhere; and monitoring the risks when an apolitical intelligence agency closely 
interacts with the policy community.
 
DeRosa, Mary.  (2004). Data Mining and Data Analysis for Counterterrorism.  
Washington, DC: CSIS Press. 
 
Defeating terrorism requires a more nimble intelligence apparatus that operates 
more actively within the United States and makes use of advanced information 
technology.  Data-mining and automated data-analysis techniques are powerful 
tools for intelligence and law enforcement officials fighting terrorism.  But these 
tools also generate controversy and concern.  They make analysis of data – 
including private data – easier and more powerful.  This can make private data 
more useful and attractive to the government.  Data-mining and data-analysis are 
simply too valuable to prohibit, but they should not be embraced without 
guidelines and controls for their use.  Policymakers must acquire an 
understanding of data-mining and automated data-analysis tools so that they can 
craft policy that encourages responsible use and sets parameters for that use. 
 
This report builds on a series of roundtable discussions held by CSIS.  It provides 
a basic description of how data-mining techniques work, how they can be used for 
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counterterrorism, and their privacy implications.  It also identifies where informed 
policy development is necessary to address privacy and other issues (DeRosa). 
 
Deutch, John and Jeffrey Smith.  (2002). “Smarter Intelligence.”  Foreign Policy, 
128: 64-70. 
 
Many proposals have been put forward to improve U.S. intelligence capabilities.  
Decisions on intelligence reform will revolve around this question of the proper 
balance between national security and law enforcement goals. Meanwhile, 
historical boundaries between organizations remain, stymieing the collection of 
timely intelligence and warnings of terrorist activity. This fragmented approach to 
intelligence gathering makes it quite possible that information collected by one 
U.S. government agency before an overt act of terrorism will not be shared and 
synthesized in time to avert it. 
 
A larger question underlying discussions of intelligence reform is, how much 
should Americans expect from the intelligence community?  While the American 
people can be better protected, they should be under no illusion that the 
intelligence community can remove all risk… Fortunately, there are not hundreds 
of [terrorist] organizations but perhaps only a few dozen, which makes the 
intelligence task feasible. But it is unreasonable to expect 100 percent success. 
Thus, while intelligence is the first line of defense, other counterterrorism efforts 
are also important, including prevention by deterrence or interdiction, bioweapons 
defense, and managing the consequences of a catastrophic terrorist attack 
whenever and wherever it occurs (Deutch and Smith). 
 
Doran, Charles F.  “Why Forecasts Fail: The Limits and Potential of Forecasting in 
International Relations and Economics.”  International Studies Review, 1(2): 
11-42. 
 
A forecast is a prediction based on knowledge of past behavior. The forecaster 
must consider to what extent past trends will continue in the future. In linear 
forecasts, the past is prologue, and forecasting amounts to linear extrapolation of 
the past trend into the future. When conditions are propitious and behavior over 
time is approximately linear, the linear forecast will fit the data tolerably well. But 
forecasts ultimately fail because no technique has been developed that allows the 
forecaster to predict, prior to the event itself, when a nonlinearity will occur. This 
essay argues that a nonlinearity is a critical point at which expectations 
(predictions) induced by the prior trend suddenly confront a profound alteration in 
that trend, indeed, an abrupt inversion. A nonlinearity is a total break from the 
past trend, a discontinuity. The theory of relative power (systemic structure) 
dynamics known as power cycle theory provides both a thorough, graphic 
explanation of this discontinuity in expectations that occurs at critical points in the 
process, and the reason why nonlinearities are impossible to derive from prior 
trends. Theoretical and empirical assessment of a process and its dynamics makes 
possible an explanation of the conditions that give rise to such nonlinearity. 
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Hence such dynamical analysis can predict that such a nonlinearity will occur, but 
in all but a closed system it still cannot predict when the nonlinearity will occur. 
 
Dupont, Alan. (2003). “Intelligence for the Twentieth-First Century.” Intelligence 
and National Security, 18(4): 15-39. 
 
The transformation of intelligence architectures, particularly in the West, is no 
less profound than that of the weapons, platforms, warfighting systems and 
governments they are designed to support and inform. Moreover, the cumulative 
weight of the changes in prospect will redefine the way in which intelligence is 
used and conceived. The old demarcation lines between strategic and operational 
intelligence and between operations and intelligence, once starkly differentiated 
will blur. Decision-makers will have better access to intelligence as a result of 
advances in 'pull' technology, which have made possible intelligence on demand 
while open source intelligence will enrich and add value to national intelligence 
databases. 
 
Although information will become more plentiful and less of a privileged source 
in the global information environment of the twenty-first century, paradoxically 
the demand for timely, high quality strategic and operational intelligence will 
intensify rather than diminish. What will distinguish the successful practitioners 
of twenty-first century intelligence is the ability to fuse and integrate all elements 
of the process to provide seamless support for policy-makers and operational 
commanders. However, despite impressive advances in integration, technical 
collection and communications no intelligence system, no matter how efficacious, 
will ever be able to completely dispel the fog of war. 
 
Fishbein, Warren and Gregory Treverton.  (2004).  “Making Sense of Transnational 
Threats.” Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers, 
3(1). 
 
Co-authored by Warren Fishbein of the Kent Center’s Global Futures Partnership 
and Gregory Treverton of the RAND Corporation, the paper proposes some 
practical ideas for adapting the organizational culture and processes in which 
analysis of these issues is done to improve understanding and warning. 
 
The authors use as a springboard for their discussion the ideas generated by a 
series of unclassified, multidisciplinary workshops with outside experts convened 
by GFP and RAND during 2003 to explore “Developing Alternative Analysis for 
Transnational Issues.” (Reports of these workshops are published separately by 
RAND Corporation in report CF-200.) In this paper, workshop insights are 
coupled with findings from further research on concepts such as intuitive 
thinking, sense-making, and mindfulness to suggest an approach for applying 
what the authors call “alternative sense-making” to complex transnational issues. 
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The ideas suggested here, however, are less a prescription for analytical practice 
than an invitation to dialogue, debate, and further research that will help advance 
the doctrine of analysis for transnational threats. 
 
Fulghum, David A.  (2001).  “Intelligence Analysis Shifts Closer to Combat.”  
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 154(25): p. 179. 
 
 Reports on the shift of military intelligence closer to combat, with knowledge of 
friend and foe more important than weapons. Initiative of the United States Air 
Force in Europe; Deployable Ground Station Four; Distributed Common Ground 
System; Changes in the processing, exploitation and distribution of intelligence 
products. 
 
Garst, Ronald and Max Gross. (1997). “On Becoming an Intelligence Analyst.” 
Defense Intelligence Journal, 6(2): 47-59. 
 
The authors seek to describe the "set of talents, skills and personal characteristics 
required of the successful all-source intelligence analyst." (Abstract from 
http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/D_folder/defij_analysis.html.) 
 
Gentry, John A.  (1995).  “Intelligence Analyst/Manager Relations at the CIA.”  
Intelligence and National Security, 10(3): 133-146. 
 
 The day-to-day, seemingly mundane interactions between analysts and their 
supervisors have major influences on the ultimate quality and usefulness of the 
analysis that intelligence agencies provide to their policymaking consumers.  
These influences can have positive or negative effects, but they become 
enduringly pernicious when poor analyst/manager relationships are systematized 
into a dysfunctional ‘culture’.  The mechanics and significance of these 
relationships have received scant attention from academics and public policy 
commentators.  The aim here is to describe and assess the relationship between 
analysts and their managers in the United States Central Intelligence Agency’s 
Directorate of Intelligence (DI) in the 1980s and early 1990s.  The CIA’s culture 
changed markedly in this period from that of previous decades. 
 
Gentry, John A.  (1993).  Lost Promise: How CIA Analysis Misserves the Nation.  
Lanham, MD: University Press of America. 
 
 Lost Promise describes and critiques the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central 
Intelligence Agency-the analytical arm of the agency. Gentry first describes the 
DI's historical and avowed mission, and in so doing, he sets a standard for 
comparison with the troubled operations of the DI since the early 1980s. He 
proposes an 18-point reform program and helps to lift the fog that surrounds the 
CIA and which protects it from serious external evaluation. Gentry corrects 
misunderstandings about CIA analysis and explains how analysis can become 
biased or "politicized." 
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George, Roger Z.  (2004).  “Fixing the Problem of Analytical Mind-Sets: Alternative 
Analysis.”  International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 
17(3): 385-404. 
 
“Mind-sets” can pose a fatal trap in [the intelligence] process: history is full of 
examples in which commanders have erred because they held to an inaccurate 
picture of the other’s value, or their goals, intentions, or capabilities. A simple 
definition of a mind-set might be a series of expectations through which a human 
being sees the world. Over time, the strategist and intelligence analyst develop 
these expectations, based on how past events have occurred; each will draw 
general conclusions about the relationships among important international 
phenomena, about how states typically behave (e.g., maximizing power vis-à-vis 
others), or about foreign leaders’ motivations. As new events occur, data 
consistent with earlier patterns of beliefs are more likely to be accepted as valid, 
while data that conflicts with an analyst’s expectations is discounted or set aside. 
It is human nature, according to many psychological studies, for individuals to 
“perceive what they expect to perceive,” and holding such mind-sets is virtually 
unavoidable. The more expert one becomes, the more firm become one’s set of 
expectations about the world. While these mind-sets can be very helpful in sorting 
through incoming data, they become an Achilles heel to a professional strategist 
or intelligence analyst when they become out of date because of new international 
dynamics. Knowing when a mind-set is becoming obsolete and in need of 
revision can test the mettle of the best expert. 
 
This challenge has no perfect or permanent solutions. But the past decade has 
brought a greater recognition that the application of rigorous analytic techniques 
can help significantly in averting the likelihood of surprise by uncovering 
analytical mind-sets and sensitizing policymakers to the inherent uncertainty 
surrounding major international developments that they confront each day. U.S. 
strategists would do well to understand these advances in analytical tradecraft, in 
order to encourage the Intelligence Community to better exploit them and to 
guard against susceptibility to distorted or inaccurate views of the world. 
 
Gill, Peter. (2004). “Securing the Globe: Intelligence and the Post-9/11 Shift from 
'Liddism' to 'Drainism’.” Intelligence and National Security, 19(3).  
 
Significant shifts have been underway in security intelligence agencies and 
processes since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. Whereas the 
previous quarter of a century had seen a considerable democratization of 
intelligence, the article examines whether UK and US government responses risk 
the re-creation of 'security states'. Changes since 9/11 in law, doctrine, the 
intelligence process - targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action - 
and oversight are considered and it is concluded that there is a danger of the 
rebirth of independent security states.  
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Goldman, David and Taylor, Stan A. (2004). “Intelligence Reform: Will More 
Agencies, Money, and Personnel Help?” Intelligence and National Security, 
19(3): 416-435. 
 
The contemporary political climate is virtually demanding significant intelligence 
reforms based on what are seen as poor performances in recent crises. Many of 
these demands will ask for new agencies, more money, and more personnel. Such 
actions could well worsen the US intelligence process rather than strengthen it. 
However, now is a propitious time to make certain internal reforms and to find a 
way for the Intelligence Community to be truly integrated. 
 
Gourley, Robert.  (1997). “Intuitive Intelligence.” Defense Intelligence Journal, 5(2): 
61-75. 
 
In times of crisis, analysts "are expected to do what they have been taught their 
whole career to avoid; they must make rapid assessments of enemy intentions and 
well developed projections based on intuition." The author makes some 
suggestions on how analysts might be better prepared to respond to requirements 
for instantaneous assessments. (Abstract from 
http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/D_folder/defij_analysis.html.) 
 
Grabo, Cynthia M. (2004). Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning.  
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Anticipating Surprise, originally written as a manual for training intelligence 
analysts during the Cold War, has been declassified and condensed to provide 
wider audiences with an inside look at intelligence gathering and analysis for 
strategic warning. Cynthia Grabo defines the essential steps in the warning 
process, examines distinctive ingredients of the analytic method of intelligence 
gathering, and discusses the guidelines for assessing the meaning of gathered 
information. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America, 
intelligence collection and analysis has been hotly debated. In this book, Grabo 
suggests ways of improving warning assessments that better convey warnings to 
policymakers and military commanders who are responsible for taking 
appropriate action to avert disaster. 
 
Grau, Lester W.  (2004).  “Something Old, Something New: Guerillas, Terrorists, 
and Intelligence Analysis.”  Military Review, 84(4): 42-49. 
 
 Focuses on the importance of U.S. military intelligence to counter guerrilla 
warfare and terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Background on the guerilla 
warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq being countered by the U.S. Armed Forces; Tools 
in counterinsurgency that can provide data to a military intelligence analyst; 
Police technique that combines spatial analysis and psychological behavior 
patterns of criminals; Role of translators and interrogators in human military 
intelligence. 
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Grundmann, William R. (1997). “Reshaping the Intelligence Production 
Landscape.” Defense Intelligence Journal, 6(2): 23-33. 
 
The "viability of the Intelligence Community will depend on the seamless 
integration of the separate intelligence organizations and the functional elements 
within those organizations." One problem area is that "[w]e are, increasingly, 
upping the pace of current intelligence production and allotting the commensurate 
level of analytic manpower to meet the requirements of continuous contingencies 
and crises. At the same time, we have incurred significant reductions in analytic 
resources as a result of funding cuts over the last five years." (Abstract from 
http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/D_folder/defij_analysis.html.) 
 
Haass, Richard. (1996). Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. 
Intelligence.  New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations. 
 
The U.S. Intelligence Community faces major challenges, including a widespread 
lack of confidence in its ability to carry out its mission competently and legally. 
One consequence of this perception is that reform of intelligence policy and 
capabilities will not be left up to the intelligence community itself. Other parts of 
the executive branch and Congress will certainly be involved. It is no less true, 
however, that the intelligence community has been adjusting to the changed 
demands of the post-Cold War world for several years and, for the most part, 
appears to be providing reliable and useful information to its customers. 
Additional reform is necessary, but should not create more problems than it solves 
and, in so doing, weaken a critical tool of U.S. national security. 
 
The recommendations of this Task Force fall under three headings: measures to 
improve the intelligence product, suggestions for internal reorganization, and 
steps to build or rebuild relationships with important external constituencies. 
 
Hansen, Brian. (2002). “Intelligence Reforms.” CQ Researcher, 12:3. 
 
Intelligence officials were warned in 1995 that terrorists were plotting to hijack 
airliners and crash them into landmark buildings in the United States. Yet, the 
horrific events that unfolded on Sept. 11 took the CIA, the FBI and the rest of the 
U.S. intelligence community by surprise. Some experts call the attacks the worst 
intelligence failure in American history, while others maintain that the nation's 
spy agencies had no way of detecting or preventing the multi-pronged, 
international conspiracy. This much is certain: The attacks have prompted 
lawmakers to impose major changes on the nation's intelligence-gathering 
agencies. But the rush to overhaul the intelligence apparatus troubles some 
experts, who fear the changes will be ineffective. Others say the reforms have 
breached the traditional wall between criminal investigations and intelligence 
gathering, potentially curtailing citizens' civil liberties. 
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Harris, Shane.  (2003). “Beautiful Minds.” Government Executive, 35(13): 21-34. 
 
Two years after the Sept. 11 attacks, U.S. intelligence agencies still rely on 
practices that thwart or water down insightful analysis, critics say. Congressional 
reports and inquiries into lapses in intelligence have criticized the agencies as 
vast, befuddled bureaucracies. Most critiques of the CIA and a dozen other 
intelligence agencies have said they must become more "modern" organizations, 
better equipped to fight terrorists. But when any organization truly changes, it is 
usually from within and not according to the prescriptions of critics. 
 
Because that is so, intelligence analysts, especially the most creative ones, offer 
the best hope that American spy agencies will find ways to better understand and 
prevent terrorism. Fixated for the past half-century on the Soviet Union and its 
vast, lumbering bureaucracy, most analysts only recently have had to think like 
the nimble, shadowy terrorists they now face.  But insightful analysis hasn't been 
widely embraced. The intelligence community sometimes is stifled by a 
compulsion to speak with one voice. The customers of intelligence agencies 
elected officials and senior leaders in federal agencies want harmony, not 
dissonance. Often, only the least conventional thinkers can tune out the noise and 
find the true notes (Harris). 
 
Hedley, John Hollister.  (2005).  “Learning from Intelligence Failures.”  
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 18(3): 435-450. 
 
The Russians have a host of sayings, and one that seems pertinent goes like this: 
“If you see a Bulgarian on the street, beat him up. He will know why.” Given the 
enormously tragic events of 11 September 2001, and the dismaying absence of 
weapons of mass destruction in post-invasion Iraq, any Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) officer seen on the street in Langley, Virginia, could be pummeled 
and would likely be someone who would know why. For nearly four years it has 
been hard to go wrong by criticizing the Agency. 
 
But putting this pummeling—verbal pummeling, thankfully—into perspective is 
possible and desirable. It is part and parcel of the “intelligence school of hard 
knocks.” It can be put into perspective with four simple observations: 
 
* Allegations of intelligence failure are inevitable. 
* This is true in large part because, in intelligence, failures are inevitable. 
* Intelligence organizations do learn (as well as suffer) from the allegations and the 
failures. 
* Even though it is impossible to learn once and for all how to prevent the 
recurrence of something inevitable, the ratio of success to failure probably can be 
improved. 
 
19 
Heuer, Jr., Richards J. (2004). “Limits of Intelligence Analysis.” Orbis 49(1): 75-94. 
 
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Report on the U.S. 
Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, dated July 7, 
2004, provides a remarkably detailed account of information available to the 
intelligence community prior to the war in Iraq and how it was analyzed. The 
general impression it gives is one of unconscionable failure, due to the 
intelligence community's very poor analysis of the information. Unfortunately, the 
magnitude and breadth of the Committee's criticism shows a serious lack of 
understanding of the problems intelligence analysts face when making judgments 
based on incomplete, ambiguous, and potentially deceptive information. 
 
This article applies insights from the psychology of intelligence analysis to help 
explain what went wrong and why. It also discusses broader questions not 
addressed in the SSCI report: What can we reasonably expect from intelligence 
analysis? And what methods and procedures are available to improve intelligence 
analysis? 
 
Heuer, Jr., Richards J.  (1999).  The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.  
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
 
 How do you beat cognitive biases? How do you set aside preconceived mind-sets 
and mental models? The author emphasizes the importance of not only analyzing 
the substance of intelligence problems, but also of understanding the analytic 
thought processes. He maintains that thinking analytically is a skill like carpentry 
or driving a car -- it can be taught, it can be learned, and it can be improved with 
practice. Heuer examines cognitive biases -- subconscious pre-conceptions that 
impair objectivity and skew analysis in such areas as evaluation of evidence, 
recognition of signs of change, perception of cause and effect, and estimation of 
future probabilities. Heuer offers techniques for confronting such biases and 
diluting their impact. This book is written in a clear, crisp, concise, jargon-free 
mode that is readily understandable. It is of value not only to other intelligence 
professionals -- that is, to managers, trainers, collectors, and technicians but also 
to anyone that has to analyze or make judgments, decisions, and predictions about 
problems and choices that arise in the course of day-to-day life. 
 
Hillsman, Roger. (1995). “Does the CIA Still Have a Role?”  Foreign Affairs, 74(5): 
104-117. 
 
 The history of intelligence since World War I shows no dividends resembling the 
miracles of spy-thriller fiction.  The benefits gained by fielding a worldwide team 
of secret agents are not worth the exorbitant cost.  Spies sometimes provide useful 
information on weapons development and other long-term threats; usually their 
information is outdated or irrelevant.  The CIA should stick to its strengths: 
analysis for policymakers and high-tech surveillance.  Cloak-and-dagger foreign 
policy tempts presidents into shirking the hard work of diplomacy and politics.  
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The practice has blackened America’s reputation and subverted its democracy 
(Foreign Affairs Abstract). 
 
Hollywood, John, Diane Snyder, Kenneth N. McKay, and John E. Boon.  (2004).  
Out of the Ordinary: Finding Hidden Threats by Analyzing Unusual Behavior.  
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
 
 Presents a unique approach to selecting and assembling disparate pieces of 
information to produce a general understanding of a threat. The Atypical Signal 
Analysis and Processing schema identifies atypical behavior potentially related to 
terror activity; puts it into context; generates and tests hypotheses; and focuses 
analysts’ attention on the most significant findings. A supporting conceptual 
architecture and specific techniques for identifying and analyzing out-of-the-
ordinary information are also described. 
 
Hulnick, Arthur S. (1999). Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence 
for the Twenty-First Century. Westport, CT: Praeger.  
 
With the end of the Cold War and the dawning of a new century, the U.S. 
intelligence system faces new challenges and threats. The system has suffered 
from penetration by foreign agents, cutbacks in resources, serious errors in 
judgment, and what appears to be bad management; nonetheless, it remains one of 
the key elements of America's strategic defense. Hulnick suggests that things are 
not as bad as they seem, that America's intelligence system is reasonably well 
prepared to deal with the many threats to national security. He examines the 
various functions of intelligence from intelligence gathering and espionage to the 
arcane fields of analysis, spy-catching, secret operations, and even the business of 
corporate espionage (Synopsis from amazon.com). 
 
Hulnick, Arthur S.  (2002).  “The Downside to Open Source Intelligence.”  
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 15(4): 565-579. 
 
Intelligence analysts, whether in government or the private sector, agree that open 
source data is the bread and butter of analysis, forming the great bulk of the 
material with which they must work. Open sources also provide the collateral 
material that informs and helps drive the intelligence collection process. No good 
case officers or intercept technicians can make sense out of what they learn 
without comprehensive knowledge of the world that surrounds their human or 
electronic sources. The argument for expanding the use of open source 
intelligence (OSINT) is made compellingly by Robert David Steele. Yet, some 
negative aspects of OSINT deserve attention. 
 
Hulnick, Arthur S. (2004). Keeping Us Safe: Secret Intelligence and Homeland 
Security. Westport, CT: Praeger. 
 
 How can the United States guard against a clever unknown enemy while still 
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preserving the freedoms it holds dear? Hulnick explains the need to revamp U.S. 
intelligence operations from a system focused on a single Cold War enemy to one 
offering more flexibility in combating non-state actors (including terrorists, spies, 
and criminals) like those responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Offering possible solutions not to be found in the federal commission's official 
report, Hulnick's groundbreaking work examines what is really necessary to make 
intelligence and homeland security more efficient and competent, both within the 
United States and abroad. 
 
Ignatius, David. (2005, April 15). “Can the Spy Agencies Dig Out.” The Washington 
Post, p. A25. 
 
The uncertainty within the intelligence community was evident at a conference 
last week at Harvard, where 100 or so spooks gathered with a few academics and 
journalists to discuss ways to restructure intelligence for the 21st century. I wish 
[John Negroponte] had been there to hear some of the ideas, and also to get a 
sense of just how disoriented intelligence professionals are these days.  
 
To correct this deficiency, the IC must refocus its management and organizational 
structure around substantive national security missions rather than collection He's 
walking into a world where people aren't sure which end is up. 
 
It's time for Negroponte to start rebuilding, but how? The new structure he will 
oversee as director of national intelligence is the biggest mystery of all. Will his 
organization be the new center for intelligence analysis? If so, what will happen to 
the many hundreds of folks who work at the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence? 
Will the DNI's new National Counterterrorism Center be the focal point for anti-
terrorism operations, effectively superseding the authority of the CIA's 
Directorate of Operations? Nobody seems to know the answers to these big 
questions, which is worrisome. 
 
So here's a modest suggestion for Negroponte: When it comes to intelligence 
reform, less is more. We need fewer, smarter people who are empowered to take 
risks and make bold judgments. We don't need a proliferation of new, 
inexperienced intelligence officers overseas who will fill quotas by recruiting 
bogus agents who produce large volumes of low-quality intelligence. We need 
real spies, not "measurable metrics." 
 
Intelligence and Analysis on Iraq:  Issues for the Intelligence Community. (29 July 
2004).  Kerr Group Reports. 
 
A series of three reports analyzing the intelligence process before the war, 
describing factors affecting the drafting of the NIE, and identifying systemic 
factors that channeled analysts’ evaluations and analyses.  Identifies failures of 
collection, uncritical analytic assumptions, and inadequate management reviews. 
 
22 
“Intelligence Gathering: Evaluating Sources for Objective Analysis.”  (2000).  
Online, 24(1): 47-50. 
 
There is little doubt that the information revolution has changed the way we all do 
business. Intelligence analysis is no exception. More information is now available 
to the analyst than ever before. However, more information is not necessarily 
synonymous with better information. To intelligence consumers, the product is 
only as credible as the sources from which it comes. And this basic concept that 
"intelligence must be based on credible objective information" is the exact reason 
why it is important to evaluate sources for intelligence analysis.  
 
This article will define both national and business intelligence, enumerate several 
factors of evaluation, consider some sources, identify some places which provide 
evaluations, and conclude with some ideas for further consideration. Also note 
that this article only considers open sources which are available for all to use. It 
will not delve into the secret, human, or technical means of collecting information 
(Online).  
 
“Intelligence Incorporated.” (2005).  Government Executive, 37(8): 40-46. 
 
Eurasia Group, a privately held firm based in Manhattan, looks and acts the way 
U.S. intelligence agencies might have to if they're going to implement the 
sweeping reforms that lawmakers and administration officials promise are in 
store. Some intelligence agencies already rely on Eurasia, and other private shops 
like it, to make sense of publicly available information and to gain expertise they 
lack in-house. But intelligence reformers insist the agencies must seek out such 
experts more frequently to fill gaps in the information that spies can provide. 
Proponents of outside analysis argue that the government doesn't always need 
classified information to understand the direction of the world. Open source 
information often is well documented, and because it has been disseminated 
widely, a broader range of experts who might discover details that others miss can 
review it. Of course, it's also collectible by just about anyone with an Internet 
connection or a library card. And this contradicts the ethos of much of U.S. 
intelligence: The best information is the hardest to get and it must be jealously 
guarded. Because information is power, the more things the government knows 
that others don't, the stronger the government. 
 
Johnson, Loch K.  (1996).  "Analysis for a New Age."  Intelligence and National 
Security, 11(4): 657-671. 
 
Working from his base on the staff of the Commission on the Roles and 
Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community (the "Aspin-Brown 
Commission"), Johnson reviews the state of U.S. intelligence analysis and offers 
his thoughts on how it might be made better. He argues that intelligence analysis 
must be "consumer-driven"; that is, analysts "must design the intelligence product 
to suit the informational -- though certainly not the political -- needs of the 
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consumer." He also urges more attention to "marketing" of its product on the part 
of the Intelligence Community. 
 
Johnson, Rob. (2005).  Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community:  An 
Ethnographic Study.  Washington, DC:  Center for the Study of Intelligence. 
 
The author conducted several hundred interviews with intelligence community 
analysts and used these data to characterize the organizational culture of the 
analytic enterprise within the US intelligence community.  Characteristics are 
broken down into systemic, systematic, idiosyncratic, and communicative 
variables.  The study uses this methodology to develop several recommendations 
for improving analysis. 
 
Jones, Morgan D.  (1998).  The Thinker’s Toolkit: 14 Powerful Techniques for 
Problem Solving.  New York, NY: Three Rivers Press. 
 
 Former CIA analyst Morgan Jones provides techniques that are easy to learn and 
easy to apply, requiring no more equipment than a pencil and a legal pad.  Armed 
with The Thinker’s Toolkit, anyone in business can start making better decisions 
today – with immediate benefits to the bottom line. 
 
Kamarck, Elaine C.  (October 2005).  Transforming the Intelligence Community:  
Improving the Collection and Management of Information.  Transformation of 
Organization Series, IBM Center for the Business of Government. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the intelligence community has engaged in much 
soul searching but with little action.  While the 9/11 attacks have prompted action, 
the solutions enacted so far do not get to some of the real world problems in the 
community.  The field of knowledge management is a convenient starting point 
for attempting to understand what has to happen for the IC to become capable of 
dealing with 21st century threats.  Knowledge management suggests that the IC of 
the future should seek to combine the tacit knowledge of the organization with its 
explicit knowledge.  The report concludes with eight recommendations aimed at 
building a different, more comprehensive intelligence community. 
 
Khalsa, Sundri. (2004). Forecasting Terrorism: Indicators and Proven Analytic 
Techniques. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Terrorist attacks happen after years of careful planning; however, these plans 
always leave a trail of activities—a road map to the terrorists' forthcoming 
actions. These indicators include terrorist travel, movement of weapons, training, 
target surveillance, and tests of security. This guidebook identifies 68 such 
indicators and shows how to analyze them using a step-by-step explanation. It 
also includes safeguards against 38 of the 42 common warning pitfalls that 
experts have identified. That analysis then yields warnings that can prevent 
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attacks and save lives. The methodology can be applied to any intelligence topic 
(not just terrorism) by simply changing the list of indicators. 
 
Warning failures are rarely due to inadequate collection; they are more frequently 
due to intelligence that has been ignored because it is delivered with weak 
analysis. With this model, author Sundri Khalsa brings sophisticated analysis 
methodology to security forces everywhere, promising a safer world. 
 
This methodology was characterized by the Unit Chief of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) Counterterrorism Threat Monitoring Unit as "light-years 
ahead," while officials in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) have identified 
this system as "the bedrock for the evolving approach to terrorism analysis," and 
an "unprecedented forecasting model." This guide will be of interest to policy 
makers, journalists, police authorities, and concerned citizens. 
 
Kindsvater, Larry. (2003). “The Need to Reorganize the Intelligence Community.” 
Studies in Intelligence, 47:1. 
 
The Intelligence Community (IC) should be reorganized to more concertedly, 
effectively, and efficiently address today’s national security intelligence needs. 
No one (except the Director of Central Intelligence) and no organizational entity 
is actually responsible for bringing together in a unified manner the entire IC’s 
collection and analytic capabilities to go against individual national security 
missions and threats, such as terrorism, North Korea, the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, and China, create new Community-wide, mission-oriented 
centers and have a leader who is truly “in charge.”  Taken together, these changes 
would fundamentally revamp the way the IC functions. 
 
The changes recommended in this paper would fundamentally alter how the IC 
actually functions, making substantive national security missions/issues/threats 
the driving managerial force across the IC, and creating organized entities with 
someone in charge who is responsible for Community-wide efforts against 
specific national security missions. This arrangement would dramatically reduce 
the intelligence collection (stovepipe) management and organizational orientation 
of the IC. Moreover, it would place a DCI with expanded authorities at the top of 
an organization, the Central Intelligence Agency, that has an IC-wide (corporate) 
mission, responsibility, and authority (Kindsvater). 
 
Lahneman, William J.  (2005). “Knowledge Sharing in the Intelligence Community 
Since 9/11.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 
17(4): 614-633. 
 
Since the quality of virtually all security and many foreign policies depend upon 
them, intelligence products constitute one extremely important type of knowledge 
product. Good intelligence analysis depends upon high-quality information 
getting to the appropriate analysts at the proper time so that knowledge creation 
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can occur.  The article describes current research in the field of knowledge 
management and applies pertinent findings to analyze the flow of information and 
the creation of knowledge in the intelligence community.  It then analyzes recent 
reform initiatives to determine if they are likely to improve or degrade knowledge 
management. 
 
Lahneman, William J.  (2004). “Outsourcing the IC’s Stovepipes?” International 
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 16(4): 573-593. 
 
The article surveys the business literature on outsourcing and determines why 
businesses continue to expand their use of this tool despite initial 
disappointments.  Next, the needs and constraints of businesses are compared and 
contrasted with those of intelligence organizations, with the finding that both 
types of organizations have many of the same needs for both security and 
knowledge sharing.  The article outlines the elements of the intelligence cycle that 
are candidates for outsourcing, argues that increased outsourcing would improve 
intelligence analysis, and offers a strategy for expanding outsourcing within the 
intelligence community. 
 
Lefebvre, Stéphane.  (2004).  “A Look at Intelligence Analysis.”  International 
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17(2): 231-264. 
 
In the days that followed the tragic terrorist attacks that took place against the 
U.S. on September 11, 2001 several analysts and politicians were quick to assign 
blame to the U.S. intelligence agencies, in particular the CIA and the FBI. That 
these agencies could not prevent the attacks was considered an immense failure. 
Intelligence analysis, is not done in a vacuum, it needs a bureaucratic structure to 
hire analysts, support their work, and channel their judgments to policy 
consumers (IJIC Abstract). 
 
Looney, Robert E.  (2004).  “DARPA’s Policy Analysis Market for Intelligence: 
Outside the Box or Off the Wall?”  International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, 17(3): 405-419. 
 
In 2003, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) proposed 
and subsequently backed off a plan to set up a kind of futures market, a Policy 
Analysis Market (PAM), that would allow investors to earn profits by betting on 
the likelihood of such events as regime changes in the Middle East. Critics, 
mainly politicians and newspaper op-ed writers, attacked the futures project on 
the grounds that it was unethical and in bad taste to accept wagers on the fate of 
foreign leaders and the likelihood of terrorist attacks. The project was canceled a 
day after it was announced. Its head, retired Admiral John Poindexter, 
subsequently resigned. 
 
The debate over the Policy Analysis Market was quite contentious, but few 
answers have been found to several critical questions: How were the markets 
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supposed to work? What were PAM’s underlying theoretical and empirical 
assumptions? What was PAM supposed to produce in the way of intelligence? 
Was the project an innovative way of thinking outside the box or just an off-the-
wall idea? 
 
Lowenthal, Mark M. (2000). Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Washington, 
DC: CQ Press. 
 
The world of intelligence is filled with intrigue, but at its core, the information-
secret or otherwise-is valuable to governments for the power it affords policy 
makers. With the constant need for background, context, and warning as well as 
an assessment of risks, benefits, and likely outcomes, the intelligence community 
plays a crucial role in policy formation. Lowenthal adeptly describes the 
development of this community while showing students how the various stages of 
the intelligence process serve an intelligence agenda that has changed 
dramatically in this post-Cold War, post-9/11 world. In this thoroughly revised 
second edition, Lowenthal updates each and every chapter, including new 
material on the infamous Robert Hanssen and Wen Ho Lee cases. Two new 
chapters significantly round out coverage: one on intelligence reform and another 
that takes a comparative look at intelligence in Britain, France, Russia, Israel, and 
China. This new edition also takes into account the impact and effects the war on 
terrorism now has on collection, analysis, and counter intelligence, as well as the 
ethical and moral issues surrounding these tasks (Synopsis from amazon.com). 
 
MacDonald, Margaret M. and Anthony G. Oettinger. (2002). "Information 
Overload:  Managing Intelligence Technologies." Harvard International 
Review, 24(3): 44-48. 
 
 Advances in scientific knowledge, translated into new technology, have made 
previously unmanageable intelligence tasks feasible and greatly increased the 
speed at which intelligence professionals perform traditional activities. And yet, 
problems that have always plagued intelligence seem impervious to the 
information revolution. The intelligence community and its customers no longer 
suffer from information scarcity but from information overload. Analysis must 
cover enormous quantities of data, in which valuable information may at best be 
implicit. Users still complain that the information pushed to them is not what they 
want or is not in a form they can use. On the other hand, knowing what to pull and 
how to pull it requires a rather sophisticated user -- and that user may overlook an 
important resource. As it collects intelligence, the intelligence community must 
constantly maintain a balance between reliance on technical means and more 
traditional sources (MacDonald and Oettinger). 
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Mahle, Melissa Boyle. (2004).  Denial and Deception:  An Insider’s View of the CIA 
From Iran-Contra to 9/11.  New York:  Nation Books. 
 
Focuses on the performance of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, but raises 
several issues that affect the Directorate of Intelligence.  Also analyzes negative 
effects of the rapid turnover in the CIA’s leadership during the 19980s and 90s. 
 
Marchio, James D. (2005). “The Evolution and Relevance of Joint Intelligence 
Centers”. Studies in Intelligence, 49(1). 
 
 One of the most common problems in joint operations is that of intelligence. The 
preferred solution lies in the establishment of a joint intelligence center. 
Information from all sources is fed into this central collecting point where it is 
collated, evaluated, and disseminated. Such an agency benefits not only the joint 
force commander, but all major commanders involved by currently posting them 
on the latest enemy information available. 
 
Marrin, Stephen P. (2004). “CIA's Kent School: Improving Training for New 
Analysts.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 
16(4): 609-637. 
 
This article provides the history behind the creation of CIA's Sherman Kent 
School in 2000, describes the CIA's career analyst program for new analysts circa 
mid-2002 (based on interviews with the Kent School’s director and three program 
managers), assesses the hypothetical benefits that improved training could have 
on institutional output, and places the training program back within institutional 
context by arguing that improved training won't be able to achieve its potential if 
organizational structures and bureaucratic processes are not aligned in ways that 
are consistent with an analyst's acquisition and application of  analytic expertise. 
 
Marrin, Stephen P.  (2003).  “Homeland Security and the Analysis of Foreign 
Intelligence.”  Intelligencer, 13(2): 25-36. 
 
 This background paper describes how foreign intelligence analysis contributes to 
homeland security. It begins with a description of the structure and operations of 
the intelligence community, and then focuses more tightly on CIA’s analytic 
practices before addressing the role of the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center in 
providing intelligence analysis to national level decisionmakers. This paper 
provides similar content but at a much greater level of granularity to the 
subsection titled “An Analyst’s Daily Taskings” and “The Finished Product” on 
pages 6-8 of the July 2004 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s Report on 
the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. 
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Marrin, Stephen P., and Jonathan D. Clemente.  (2006).  “Improving Intelligence 
Analysis by Looking to the Medical Profession.”  International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 18(4): 707-729. 
 
Intelligence agencies might benefit from assessing existing medical practices for 
possible use in improving the accuracy of intelligence analysis and its 
incorporation into policymaking. The processes used by the medical profession to 
ensure diagnostic accuracy may provide specific models for Intelligence 
Community use that could improve the accuracy of analytic procedures. The 
medical profession’s way of accumulation, organization, and use of information 
for purposes of decisionmaking could also provide a model for the national 
security field to adopt in its quest for more effective means of information 
transfer. Some limitations to the analogy are inevitable due to intrinsic differences 
between the fields, but the study of medicine could provide intelligence 
practitioners with a valuable source of insight into various reforms with the 
potential to improve the craft of intelligence. 
 
Marrin, Stephen P.  (2005).  “Preventing Intelligence Failures By Learning From 
the Past.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17(4): 
655-672. 
 
 This article profiles the strategic surprise and intelligence failure literatures to 
derive ideas for reforms—including various means to improve the accuracy of 
intelligence such as alternative analysis or competitive analysis--that could 
improve the quality of intelligence analysis and possibly prevent future 
intelligence failures. It concludes: "The identification of causes of past failure 
leads to kernels of wisdom in the form of process modifications that could make 
the intelligence product more useful. A more effective, more accurate intelligence 
capability may still be vulnerable to the cognitive and institutional pathologies 
that cause failure, but a self-conscious and rigorous program based on the lessons 
derived from the existing literature would strengthen the intelligence product. 
This might lead to greater policymaker ability to respond to challenges, and 
thereby contribute to the national security of the United States." 
 
McIvor, Anthony D., ed. (2005).  Rethinking the Principles of War.  Annapolis, MD:  
Naval Institute Press. 
 
Part Five – “Intelligence:  Winning the Silent Wars” – contains the following 
chapters: Rethinking War and Intelligence, William M. Nolte; Beyond 
Intelligence Reform:  The Case for a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs, Deborah 
G. Barger;  The Weakest Link:  Intelligence for Preemptive and Preventive 
Military Action, Richard L. Russell;  Making the Case:  Defense 
Counterintelligence as a Strategic Asset, Anthony D. McIvor; Does Intelligence 
Have a Future Tense?, Wesley K. Wark; Intelligence Transformation Past and 
Future: The Evolution of War and U.S. Intelligence, Michael Warner; Refocusing 
Intelligence:  The Art of Analysis, Keith M. Masback. 
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McLaughlin, John E. (1997). “New Challenges and Priorities for Analysis.” Defense 
Intelligence Journal, 5(2): 11-21. 
 
Changes in the world around us and in the expectations of consumers "add up to a 
fundamental shift in the analytical priorities for CIA and others in the 
[Intelligence] Community.... Tapping into analytic expertise across the 
Community and coordinating on collection activity will be essential to overcome 
budget and personnel constraints." (Abstract from  
http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/D_folder/defij_analysis.html.) 
 
Medina, Carmen A. (2002). "What to Do When Traditional Models Fail: The 
Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis." Studies in Intelligence 46(3): 
23-28. 
 
The great challenge facing analysts and managers in the DI is providing real 
insight to smart policymakers.  Intelligence officers have long believed that 
careful attention to the tradecraft of intelligence analysis would lead to work that 
added value to the information available to policymakers.  During its 50-plus 
years, the CIA evolved a model that needed only successful execution to produce 
quality intelligence analysis.  When we faltered, we blamed the analysts, but not 
the model. 
 
What if the failing, however, lies not with the analysts but with the model they are 
asked to follow?  Customer needs and preferences are changing rapidly, as is the 
environment in which intelligence analysis operates.  Yet the DI’s approach to 
analysis has hardly changed over the years.  Stability is often comforting, but in 
the DI’s case change may be what is most needed.  Analysts today must add value 
in an era of information overabundance, dig deep to surpass the analytic abilities 
of their customers, and reach beyond political analysis, an area in which it is 
particularly hard to provide value to policymakers (Medina). 
 
Mena, Jesús.  (2003).  Investigative Data Mining for Security and Criminal Detection.  
Burlington, MA: Elsevier Science. 
 
Investigative Data Mining for Security and Criminal Detection is the first book to 
outline how data mining technologies can be used to combat crime in the 21st 
century. It introduces security managers, law enforcement investigators, counter-
intelligence agents, fraud specialists, and information security analysts to the 
latest data mining techniques and shows how they can be used as investigative 
tools. Readers will learn how to search public and private databases and networks 
to flag potential security threats and root out criminal activities even before they 
occur. 
 
The groundbreaking book reviews the latest data mining technologies including 
intelligent agents, link analysis, text mining, decision trees, self-organizing maps, 
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machine learning, and neural networks. Using clear, understandable language, it 
explains the application of these technologies in such areas as computer and 
network security, fraud prevention, law enforcement, and national defense. 
International case studies throughout the book further illustrate how these 
technologies can be used to aid in crime prevention. Investigative Data Mining for 
Security and Criminal Detection will also serve as an indispensable resource for 
software developers and vendors as they design new products for the law 
enforcement and intelligence communities. 
 
Moore, David T., Lisa Krizan, and Elizabeth J. Moore.  “Evaluating Intelligence: A 
Competency-Based Model.”  International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, 18(2): 204-220. 
 
When strategic surprise confronts a nation, the accusation of intelligence failure 
often follows. The trigger is something dire: an attack on the nation’s warships or 
mainland, the presence of nuclear missiles on a nearby island, the fall of a key 
ally in a volatile region, or an invasion of another ally by a regional bully. 
Conversely, only rarely do accolades give credit to intelligence for strategic 
success. Conventional excuses to protect sources and methods notwithstanding, 
this reflects a widespread lack of understanding of the factors that determine 
intelligence success. Yet, the interpretation of failure or success depends on 
accurately evaluating that unique form of knowledge provided to policy—and 
decisionmaking consumers—in other words, the evaluation of intelligence. 
 
A competency-based model for defining analysis offers one means of evaluating 
intelligence. This model leads to both improved intelligence production—
resulting in the products provided to intelligence consumers, and an improved 
intelligence process—the means by which that product is produced.  
 
Nance, Malcolm W.  (2003).  The Terrorist Recognition Handbook.  Guilford, CT: 
Lyons Press. 
 
 Whether they are acting as a one-person cell, or with a sophisticated global 
finance and logistics network, terrorists can be members of nearly any race, sex, 
religion, or political persuasion. But every terrorist operation always has certain 
characteristics, and the only effective way to identify and prevent terrorists is to 
observe their behavior and analyze it with an intelligence-based approach. For the 
first time, a former U.S. military anti-terrorism intelligence officer reveals 
thousands of Terrorist Attack Pre-incident Indicators (TAPIs) in The Terrorist 
Recognition Handbook. 
 
With dozens of incident case studies and hundreds of illustrations, The Terrorist 
Recognition Handbook is the first and only commercially available handbook that 
debunks the aura of mystery surrounding terrorist activities as it uncovers the 
terrorists' means, methods, organization, and motivations. It will be an invaluable 
resource and training guide for police officers, SWAT teams, federal officials, 
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security companies, local water boards, chemical plants, oil refineries, power 
generating facilities, electrical and telephone utilities, airport facilities, public 
transportation officials, education officials, journalists, and ordinary citizens. 
 
Nolte, William.  “Keeping Pace with the Revolution in Intelligence Affairs.”  Studies 
in Intelligence, 48/1:  1-9. 
 
The article observes that rapid changes in military and diplomatic spheres – 
embodied most prominently by the Revolution in Military Affairs – implies that a 
Revolution in Intelligence Affairs is imminent or already in progress.  The 
intelligence community must embrace this concept, study its ramifications, and 
adapt to the new circumstances if it is to avoid failure or irrelevance.  In this 
regard, the intelligence community needs to focus less on structure and more on 
behavior. 
 
O'Connell, Kevin and Robert Tomes. (2004). “Keeping the Information Edge.” 
Policy Review, 122: 19-38. 
 
Despite advances in information technology and knowledge management within 
the most visible area of national security — the military — America’s overall 
commitment to preserving its information edge across the larger security 
bureaucracy foundered during the 1990s. To be sure, the situation is improving. 
Great strides in information sharing are being made. Yet we contend that despite 
significant initiatives to transform, government-wide information sharing 
innovations and intelligence-integration initiatives are evolving too slowly. 
 
We believe that the coming year will witness an unparalleled national debate over 
the future of American intelligence. Attention at the official level will be 
necessary to effect change, but by itself it is insufficient. What will also be needed 
is a reasoned public debate about the purposes and dynamics of U.S. intelligence.  
The heated debate over the state of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, charges 
that the intelligence cycle is being politicized, and a perceived lack of innovation 
in the integration of diverse intelligence sources are likely to amplify arguments 
over intelligence modernization. 
 
All of these are appropriate considerations for an intelligence transformation 
debate, but they are not necessarily useful for organizing action. We believe that 
the appropriate research question for the policy community is not who in the U.S. 
government — intelligence agency, law enforcement entity, or other — failed to 
react to specific information about the individuals associated with the September 
11 attacks. Rather, policymakers should be asking what levels of political, 
financial, and intellectual resources leaders and the public at large are willing to 
commit — and whether that commitment will last (O’Connell and Tomes). 
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Odom, William E. (2003). Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America.  New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
 
Security depends on intelligence. This is a discussion of basic problems in 
American intelligence and how to fix them, outlining fundamental restructuring of 
this vast network of agencies, technology and human agents. Odom’s 
recommendations for revamping this essential component of American security 
are here available for general readers as well as for policymakers. While giving an 
overview of the world of US intelligence, Odom shows that the failure of 
American intelligence on 9/11 had much to do with the complex bureaucratic 
relationships existing among the various components of the Intelligence 
Community. The sustained fragmentation within the Intelligence Community 
since World War II is part of the story; the blurring of security and intelligence 
duties is another. Odom describes the various components of American 
intelligence in order to give readers an understanding of how complex they are 
and what can be done to make them more effective in providing timely 
intelligence and more efficient in using their large budgets. He shows definitively 
that they cannot be remedied with quick fixes but require deep study of the entire 
bureaucracy and the commitment of the US government to implement the 
necessary reforms (Synopsis from amazon.com). 
 
Ott, Marvin.  (1994).  “Shaking up the CIA.”  Foreign Policy, 93: 132. 
 
Examines concerns over the performance and integrity of the Directorate of 
Intelligence, the analytic arm of the Central Intelligence Agency. A highly 
capable, deeply flawed instrument of policy support; Director James Woolsey; 
Why the intelligence cognoscenti in the press and the congressional oversight 
committees have largely ignored the DI; Expected rise in importance of DI; 
Criteria for judging intelligence analysis; DI's three significant weaknesses; 
Primary tasks. 
 
Pappas, Aris A. and James Simon. (2002). “Daunting Challenges, Hard Decisions:  
The Intelligence Community: 2001 – 2015.”  Studies in Intelligence, 46(1). 
 
Over the past decade, commission upon commission has urged reform of the 
loose confederation that is the US Intelligence Community. Opposed by 
implacable champions of the status quo, precious few of these commissions have 
provoked meaningful change.  Ten years after the end of the Cold War, the threat 
of a nuclear Armageddon has receded, but the collapse of world communism and 
its repercussions are still works in progress. In a world with only one remaining 
superpower, even small and materially poor states and groups can pose terrible 
threats. 
  
This paper argues for a fundamental review and change in a strong and heavily 
traditional community of proud organizations.  These organizations are 
challenged by attacks on what may be their most treasured measure of self-worth: 
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their relevancy.  Intelligence must be shaped to reflect the world in which it lives. 
Success will not be measured by our ability to find marginally better ways to use 
our existing resources, but in our ability to seek out and employ whatever is 
needed to do the new job. Neither easy nor cheap, the costs and risks of doing 
anything else are simply unacceptable. When the world changes, the single most 
important requirement for intelligence is to change with it (Pappas and Simon). 
 
Peters, Katherina McIntire. (1996). “Intelligence Lost.” Government Executive, 
28(11): 20. 
 
In the next 10 years, nearly half the agency's civilian employees could retire, 
taking with them their invaluable experience and knowledge accumulated over 
many years of service.  Budget and personnel cuts, a revolution in technology, 
and the end of the Cold War have converged to force a major shift in the way DIA 
does business. At no time in the intelligence agency's 35-year history has it been 
required to do so much, so quickly-and in coming years, with so little depth of 
experience.  
 
The trend alarms some Pentagon planners, especially as the field commanders in 
the shrinking military become more dependent on DIA for tactical intelligence. 
And while field commanders are becoming more reliant on DIA for intelligence, 
fewer employees of DIA have military experience.  To provide the intelligence 
support the military community will need in the future, DIA will need more 
people with broad analytical skills and technological proficiency (Peters). 
 
Petersen, Martin.  (2005).  “Toward a Stronger Intelligence Product: Making the 
Analytic Review Process Work.”  Studies in Intelligence (Unclassified 
Edition), 49(1). 
 
Like the tides, criticism of the analytic review process is predictable, relentless, 
eternal, and potentially destructive. Those who argue for more power to the 
drafter present a bill of particulars that alleges the process does little to improve 
the product, reduces judgments to the lowest common denominator, stifles 
creativity, and takes analysis out of the hands of the experts. Those who defend 
the review process counter that it sharpens focus, guarantees that the piece 
addresses policymaker concerns, taps all relevant expertise, and ensures a 
corporate product. Both sides agree on one thing—that there ought to be fewer 
layers of review—and both miss the key point. 
 
Posner, Richard A. (2005). Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the 
Wake of 9/11.  Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Richard A. Posner, in the first full-length study of the post-9/11 movement for 
intelligence reform, argues that the 9/11 Commission's analysis, on which 
Congress relied heavily in enacting the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004, was superficial and its organizational proposals unsound. 
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The Commission, followed by Congress, exaggerated the benefits of centralizing 
control over intelligence; neglected the relevant scholarship dealing with surprise 
attacks, organization theory, and the principles of intelligence, and the experience 
of foreign nations—some of which have a longer history of fighting terrorism 
than the United States; and as a result ignored the psychological, economic, 
historical, sociological, and comparative dimensions of the issue of intelligence 
reform. 
 
Posner explains, however, that a ray of hope remains: The reorganization 
provisions of the new Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act are so 
vague—as a result of intense politicking—that the actual shape of the reorganized 
system will depend critically on decisions made by the President in implementing 
the Act. In a searing critique, Posner exposes the pitfalls created by the new 
legislation, identifies the issues overlooked by the 9/11 Commission and 
Congress, and suggests directions for real reform. (Posner) 
 
Prados, John.  (2004).  “Intelligence: No Easy Fix.”  Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
60(5): 17-19. 
 
 A struggle by entrenched parties is likely to torpedo genuine intelligence 
community reform; the next CIA will not differ much from the old one. 
 
Quinn, Jr., James L.  (2000).  “Staffing the Intelligence Community: The Pros and 
Cons of an Intelligence Reserve.”  International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, 13(2): 160-170. 
 
Considerable debate has taken place in recent years, both in Congress and within 
the Intelligence Community (IC), about the formation of a reserve component 
specifically designed for the IC. Responsible members of the IC and 
policymaking communities seem to be committed to the idea that there will be an 
intelligence reserve. According to Dr. Mark M. Lowenthal, a former staff director 
of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, ``This is something 
that’s going to happen.’’ But significant details remain to be worked out. While 
there was virtual unanimity - at least among those interviewed here - that some 
kind of civilian intelligence reserve would be established, wide disagreement 
existed on exactly what such a program might entail. The benefits and limitations 
of such a program, and an assessment of a variety of factors that would be critical 
to its implementation, including various suggestions as to the type of intelligence 
reserve that might be appropriate are examined here. The objective is not to 
recommend a specific policy, but rather to lay out options and arguments. 
 
Ramsbotham, David.  (1995).  “Analysis and Assessment for Peacekeeping 
Operations.”  Intelligence and National Security, 10(3): 162-174. 
 
 The aim of this essay is to examine the role of intelligence analysis and 
assessment in support of peacekeeping operations in a changing world.  
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Necessarily, this means the essay will focus on what [the author] perceive[s] to be 
the intelligence needs of the United Nations (UN), because its global 
responsibilities ‘to maintain international peace and security’ make it the primary 
‘employer’ of peacekeeping forces. This essay will examine the intelligence needs 
of the three types of missions included under the generic term peacekeeping: 
preventative action, conflict resolution (whether traditional peacekeeping or peace 
enforcement), and post conflict reconstruction (or peace-building), each of which 
will be examined in turn. 
 
Rieber, Steven Rieber and Neil Thomason, “Creation of a National Institute for 
Analytic Methods,” Studies in Intelligence 49/4:  71-77. 
 
The article cites evidence that the opinions of experts regarding the types of 
analytic methods that actually work may be misleading or seriously wrong.  
Accordingly, past practices of compiling best practices as a way to train future 
analysts might hamper rather than improve analysis.  The authors argue for a 
systematic approach using rigorous scientific studies to determine what practices 
work and what doesn’t in intelligence analysis. 
 
Rieber, Steven. (2004). “Intelligence Analysis and Judgmental Calibration.” 
International Journal of Intelligence & Counter Intelligence, 17(1): 97-112. 
 
Evidence exists that experts in international affairs—including intelligence 
analysts—are poor at estimating the probability that a predicted outcome will 
occur. The probability judgments made by medical experts are equally poor: this 
indicates that rapid feedback about whether the outcome has occurred (“outcome 
feedback”) is not sufficient to ensure good judgment about probabilities. What 
does seem to help is “calibration feedback,” that is, data on how well one’s 
subjective probability estimates correspond to the number of correct predictions. 
Calibration feedback should therefore be tested as a training technique for 
intelligence analysts, and intelligence analysts ought to be provided with on-the-
job feedback about their own calibration. Making accurate probability judgments, 
a skill essential to intelligence analysis, is one that apparently can be improved. In 
addition to training and feedback, two other techniques might enhance this vital 
skill: one involves encouraging analysts to think in terms of frequencies instead of 
just percentage likelihoods, while the other stresses consideration of alternative 
reasons and hypotheses. 
 
Ronczkowski, Michael. (2004). Terrorism and Organized Hate Crime:  Intelligence 
Gathering, Analysis, and Investigations.  Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 
 
In response to the current terrorist threat, law enforcement agencies at every level 
have expanded technological and intelligence-gathering initiatives in order to 
support new tactical, investigative and deployment strategies. The demand for 
homeland security requires that agencies hire professional and specially trained 
criminal and intelligence analysts to find and pre-empt any potential threat.  
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Agencies must now determine how to train these analysts and properly identify 
and respond to critical intelligence. Terrorism and Organized Hate Crime: 
Intelligence Gathering, Analysis, and Investigations provides a framework for 
exploring the issues that all new or existing analysts and investigators must face, 
including what information to gather, how to analyze it, and the effectiveness of 
crime analysts investigating terrorism. Training in proactive analytical-based 
investigation has been around for less than thirty years. Events now mandate that 
unavoidable importance of understanding "terrorism analysis." This expert 
overview provides the crucial foundation of criminal intelligence gathering and 
analysis and defines the nature of terrorism and its practitioners, subjects of vital 
importance if local agencies are to play an effective role in the battle against terror 
(Synopsis from amazon.com). 
 
Rovner, Joshua, and Austin Long.  (2005).  “The Perils of Shallow Theory: 
Intelligence Reform and the 9/11 Commission.”  International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 18(4): 609-637. 
 
 Despite its unique influence on the current reorganization of American 
intelligence, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States 
(the 9/11 Commission) got it wrong. In examining the theories of failure 
presented by the Commission and assessing how closely its recommendations are 
linked to those theories, two principal arguments are here presented. First, the 
proposed reforms are mostly unrelated to the postulated causes of failure. Second, 
the theories are underdeveloped, contradictory, and basically unsatisfying on their 
own terms. For these reasons, large organizational reforms are unlikely to 
significantly improve intelligence performance. 
 
Russel, Kevin.  (2004).  “The Subjectivity of Intelligence Analysis and Implications 
for the U.S. National Security Strategy.”  SAIS Review, 24(1): 147-163. 
 
 The language used to describe intelligence estimates as objective reflections of 
available evidence has led in some cases to a misunderstanding of the role of 
intelligence in supporting the decision to go to war in Iraq. Saying that the 
estimate that identified the threats was either "right" or "wrong" ignores the 
probabilistic nature of intelligence assessments and the necessary subjective 
elements that make them useful to policymakers. By making this clear in the case 
of Iraq, we can separate the crucial question of how policy should be decided in 
the face of increased uncertainty and even more elusive enemies than have been 
faced in the past. Only then does it make sense to say how intelligence can be 
made more useful, leaving behind the misguided question of whether the 
intelligence community was right or wrong on Iraq. 
 
Samuelson, Douglas. (2005). “Agents of Change.” OR/MS Today, 32(1): pg. 26. 
 
 Agent-based modeling (ABM) encompasses approaches and practitioners from 
operations research, artificial intelligence, social network theory, cognitive 
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science and other various disciplines. The basic idea is to expand traditional 
simulation to include entities whose behavior can change over time, depending on 
the circumstances they encounter. The field has grown explosively in numerous 
directions over the past 10 years, with important applications in war gaming, 
intelligence analysis, organizational performance, social policy and other areas. 
Many agent-based models now are complex enough, and deal with sufficiently 
sensitive issues, that validation becomes problematic. There may be a need to 
focus less on prediction and reliance on some physical reality external to the 
subject of interest, so there is a move away from traditional ideas of validation 
and toward credible use. 
 
Sangillo, Gregg and Siobhan Gorman.  (2004).  “Smarter Intelligence: A Post-9/11 
Priority.”  National Journal, 36(21): 1572-1579. 
 
 This article profiles ten experts on intelligence reform, from both within and 
outside the U.S. Intelligence Community.  The result is a collection of ideas on 
how to strengthen analysis, streamline production, and adapt to the global age of 
information. 
 
Scalingi, Paula L.  (1995).  “Proliferation and Arms Control.”  Intelligence and 
National Security, 10(3): 150-161. 
  
 Proliferation and arms control are not ‘new’ analytical priorities as such.  Both 
have been among the more important intelligence responsibilities for years.  
Intelligence traditionally is responsible for monitoring compliance with arms 
control, nonproliferation and technology transfer agreements and for assessing 
current and prospective proliferation activities on a global basis. 
 
 What is new is the recognition that proliferation, along with increasing ethnic and 
nationalist strife is emerging as the foremost threat to international stability.  
Consequently, governments have been expanding the scope of their national 
security policy agendas in order better to deter, reduce, eliminate, or regulate the 
transfer of a wide range of weapons, equipment, related technologies, and 
materials.  Because policy drives intelligence requirements, analysts whose 
‘accounts’ focus on the proliferation threat or arms control support are facing an 
increasing array of challenges – at a time when many countries are cutting 
defense and intelligence resources due to budgetary constraints. 
 
 Such a world is not far in the future.  Electronic dissemination will fundamentally 
change the relationship between the intelligence analysts and his or her customer, 
whether that customer is a military commander or a civilian policy-maker; 
moreover, in doing so electronic dissemination will bring significant changes in 
the ways in which intelligence analysts work. 
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Schrage, Michael.  (2005, February 20).  “What Percent Is 'Slam Dunk'?; 
Give Us Odds on Those Estimates.”  Washington Post, p. B01 
 
The controversial decision to reorganize America's sprawling intelligence 
establishment has set in motion the most sweeping bureaucratic change for 
sensors, spies and satellites since the end of World War II. Unfortunately, the 
odds are excellent that this multibillion dollar structural shuffle -- capped last 
week by the appointment of veteran diplomat John Negroponte as the new 
national intelligence director -- will do little to improve the quality of intelligence 
analysis for this country. 
 
Why? Because America's intelligence community doesn't like odds. Yet the 
simplest and most cost-effective innovation that community could adopt would be 
to embrace them. It's time to require national security analysts to assign numerical 
probabilities to their professional estimates and assessments as both a matter of 
rigor and of record. Policymakers can't weigh the risks associated with their 
decisions if they can't see how confident analysts are in the evidence and 
conclusions used to justify those decisions. The notion of imposing intelligence 
accountability without intelligent counting -- without numbers -- is a fool's errand. 
 
Segell, Glen M.  “Intelligence Methodologies Applicable to the Madrid Train 
Bombings, 2004.”  International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, 18(2): 221-238. 
 
An inherent difficulty facing intelligence agencies led to the inability to prevent 
the al-Qaeda Madrid commuter train bombing on 11 March 2004—exactly 911 
days after the 11 September 2001 (9/11) al-Qaeda attacks in the United States. 
Intelligence analysts can be 100 percent accurate on future events only if the 
information is 100 percent specific and certain. In general, the intelligence agency 
data gatherers and analysts face severe limitations, given that their mandate is not 
to be historians in describing the past but rather to be accurate in both forecasting 
and predicting the future. To be sure, there are few good sources of data on events 
yet to happen, as is the dilemma where too many variables exist. This is the 
essential difference between ad hoc intelligence gathering and analysis and 
specific actionable intelligence gathering and analysis. 
 
Given this, three potential methodologies are available in ad hoc intelligence 
gathering and analysis, inferred and referred to in seminal literature, to predict and 
forecast an act or event that has not been clearly identified These are: (1) trends 
and patterns, (2) frequency, and (3) probability. The three methodologies are 
broad in conceptualization, given that at any given stage the emphasis may be on 
one or more or, indeed, that all three may be utilized simultaneously. 
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Sharfman, Peter.  (1995).  “Intelligence Analysis in an Age of Electronic 
Dissemination.”  Intelligence and National Security, 10(3): 201-211. 
 
 Imagine a world in which the technologies and the concepts of the Internet were 
applied to the transmission of intelligence from the ‘producer’ to the user, 
whether that user is a policy-maker in the capital or a military commander in the 
field.  Intelligence agencies would create electronic databases into which their 
products would be entered.  Users would search these databases for intelligence 
relevant to their concerns, and then download this intelligence on to the users’ 
own computer, where it could be combined as desired with other intelligence 
products drawn from other databases on the same network. 
 
Sims, Jennifer E and Burton Gerber.  (2005).  Transforming U.S. Intelligence.  
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
 
 Transforming U.S. Intelligence supports the mandate of the new director of 
national intelligence by offering both careful analysis of existing strengths and 
weaknesses in U.S. intelligence and specific recommendations on how to fix its 
problems without harming its strengths. These recommendations, based on 
intimate knowledge of the way U.S. intelligence actually works, include 
suggestions for the creative mixing of technologies with new missions to bring 
about the transformation of U.S. intelligence without incurring unnecessary harm 
or expense. The goal is the creation of an intelligence community that can rapidly 
respond to developments in international politics, such as the emergence of 
nimble terrorist networks while reconciling national security requirements with 
the rights and liberties of American citizens. (Sims & Gerber) 
 
Sloan, Stephen.  (2002).  “Meeting the Terrorist Threat: The Localization of 
Counter Terrorism Intelligence.”  Police Practice and Research, 3(4): 337-
345. 
 
It has long been recognized that intelligence is at the heart of countering 
terrorism. It is vital that intelligence capabilities are refined and extended beyond 
the national intelligence community since ultimately the state and local authorities 
must be involved in identifying, analyzing, and responding to threats, acts, etc. By 
achieving the necessary integration between all levels of government, the U.S. can 
more effectively develop measures and defense against terrorism (Sloan). 
 
Stack, Kevin P.  (1998).  “Competitive Intelligence.”  Intelligence and National 
Security, 13(4): 194-202. 
 
 In 1976, the Intelligence Community experimented with a “Team B” approach to 
competitive intelligence, where a group of outside Soviet experts examined the 
same intelligence as the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, yet produced 
drastically different conclusions regarding the Soviet Union’s capabilities and 
intensions.  Even though the experiment ultimately ended in a polarized debate 
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between extremists and has been dubbed a failure ever since, proposals for Team 
B exercises in national intelligence products have resurfaced in recent years.  
While advocates of this approach argue that policymakers would benefit from this 
type of dual analysis, the author argues that the expanding role of Open Source 
intelligence, the existence of overlapping analytical agencies, and the time 
constraints of policymakers would contribute to a repeat failure of Team B 
exercises. 
 
Steele, Robert David.  (1995).  “Private Enterprise Intelligence: Its Potential 
Contribution to National Security.”  Intelligence and National Security, 10(3): 
212-228. 
 
 Open Source intelligence has maintained a modest role within the larger 
intelligence communities, and a more central role within the smaller intelligence 
communities, but the reality is that the Anglo-Saxon intelligence communities of 
today exploit less than 10 percent of what is available from the private sector.  
The aim of this essay is to explore the larger strategic context within which 
private enterprise intelligence can make a contribution to national security; to 
understand operational concepts from private enterprise intelligence which can 
and should be adopted by the traditional government intelligence services; and 
finally, to make an inventory of some of the specific private enterprise 
intelligence capabilities which can be used by the government to achieve both 
tactical results and sustained savings. 
 
Steinberg, James, Mary Graham, and Andrew Eggers.  (2003).  “Building 
Intelligence to Fight Terrorism.”  Brookings Institution Policy Brief 125. 
 
Policymakers must go further to build a new intelligence system to support 
transformed national security needs.  Even if they are careful in defining a new 
structure for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating national security 
information, they cannot avoid difficult questions about how to improve security 
while furthering openness and protecting personal privacy. Vigorous public 
debate is essential to answering these questions. Clear guidelines, formulated in a 
deliberative process, can assure public confidence in new policies. Information 
technology can provide tools to minimize these conflicts, foster collaboration, and 
help assure that the right information gets to the right people at the right time. 
Nonetheless, missteps are inevitable. Procedures that provide accountability and 
oversight can assure that lessons from early experiences strengthen the nation’s 
information strategies to fight terrorism (Steinberg, Graham and Eggers). 
 
 “Strategic Investment Plan for Intelligence Community Analysis.” [Electronic 
Resource].  Washington, DC:  Central Intelligence Agency, 2001.  Accessible 
at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS16241L.
 
This Strategic Investment Plan for Intelligence Community Analysis (SIP) 
provides the analytic community with the unprecedented opportunity to achieve 
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the unifying goals of the DCI’s Strategic Intent and to translate today’s challenges 
into tomorrow’s resource requirements.  The historic willingness to begin 
planning our future together stems, in part, from the growing perception that 
collaboration is the best way to achieve common goals for: a 
skilled, expert, diverse and more mobile work force enabled by technology and 
armed with the best analytic tools; a collection-smart work force that is trained 
and deployed and has the resources to assist collectors with 
requirements, evaluation, and procurement; a collaborative work force that 
leverages the production of each agency to provide the best Community support 
to customers; and an outward-looking work force that systematically exploits the 
information and expertise of sources beyond the Intelligence Community to 
produce the most authoritative strategic and current analysis possible (Strategic 
Investment Plan).    
 
Swaka, Ken.  (2004).  “Strategic Intelligence: An Oxymoron.”  Competitive 
Intelligence Magazine, 7(1): 14. 
 
 A few exceptional companies aside, competitive intelligence for the most part has 
not achieved a degree of sophistication that would enable it to play a regular role 
in strategic planning and development. Intelligence analysis - the foundation for 
strategic intelligence - has suffered from a general failure of analysts to apply 
analytic methodologies, develop true insights, and present their conclusions with 
the confidence necessary to gain management's ear. For managers, the benefits of 
tactical intelligence are easier to measure. Truth be told, most Competitive 
Intelligence practitioners don't have the choice of being tactical or strategic - they 
need to do both. Emphasis needs to be placed on the area, which can provide the 
most unique value. How do you set the right emphasis? First, determine how your 
company sets strategy. Next, conduct a self-assessment. Then, evaluate how you 
relate to strategic management. Finally, determine how your efforts are measured. 
 
Swensen, Russell, ed.  (2003).  Bringing Intelligence About:  Practitioners Reflect on 
Best Practices.  Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, Center 
for Strategic Intelligence Research. 
 
Foreword by Mark Lowenthal.  Chapters include:  The Intelligence Pro and the 
Professor: Toward an Alchemy of Applied Arts and Sciences, by Pauletta Otis; 
Via the Internet, by John Turner; Visit to Mazagon Dockyard, Bombay, by F.G. 
Satterthwaite; Improving CIA Analysis by Overcoming Institutional Obstacles, by 
Stephen Marrin; Appraising Best Practices in Defense Intelligence Analysis, by 
Thomas A. Garin; Core Competencies for Intelligence Analysis at the National 
Security Agency, by David T. Moore and Lisa Krizan; and The U.S. Coast Guard 
Joins the Intelligence Community, by Michael E. Bennett. 
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Teitelbaum, Lorne.  (2005).  The Impact of the Information Revolution on 
Policymakers’ use of Intelligence Analysis.  Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation. 
  
 This dissertation compares how policymakers have traditionally used intelligence 
with how they are using it today, examining the effects that new technology and 
open sources of information, such as the World Wide Web, are having on how the 
policy community uses intelligence. The author examines three foreign policy 
cases from the late 1950s and early 1960s to establish how the traditional 
intelligence-policy relationship evolved. He then describes three modern foreign 
policy cases and analyzes how policymakers' use of intelligence to support the 
policymaking process has changed. He concludes that the intelligence community 
has tried to adapt to the information revolution with the adoption of a network 
named Intelink but has not fully supported this network as a means for 
disseminating intelligence to policymakers, nor have policymakers adopted it. 
Internet and web-based sources of analysis have not become major contributors to 
the policymaking process. Overall, policymakers still find intelligence analysis 
useful for supporting the policymaking process, especially when it is conveyed 
through a one-on-one intelligence briefing, but for situations that require the most 
timely information, policymakers often rely on the telephone to call someone for 
information, and more and more are relying on CNN. 
 
Treverton, Gregory F.  (2005).  The Next Steps in Reshaping intelligence.  Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
 
 Two national commissions' findings helped to lay the groundwork for the 
December 2004 intelligence reorganization bill. Most notably, the bill calls for a 
new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to head and coordinate the U.S. 
Intelligence Community. Currently, the DNI has broad responsibilities but only 
ambiguous authorities. Drawing on a number of projects for various intelligence 
agencies, as well as additional research, the author of this paper looks at this 
position of DNI and how it will interact and coordinate with intelligence agencies 
and other elements of the Executive Branch. In addition to organizational 
changes, the author looks at the cultural changes that need to take place in the 
community, including those related to capacity building, issue-based collection, 
analysis improvement, wider diversity of workforce, and targeting collection. In 
particular, the paper highlights the importance of moving toward center-based 
organizations and away from the "stovepipes" of the Cold War. In accomplishing 
such goals, the DNI will begin to turn his formal authority into real authority. 
 
Treverton, Gregory F.  (2003).  Intelligence: The Achilles Heel of the Bush Doctrine.  
Arms Control Today, 33(6). 
 
Highlights the incompetence of the U.S. intelligence to locate and preemptively 
target weapons of mass destruction, as of September 2003. Strategy of the 
administration of President Bush in making its case for war against Iraq, technical 
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innovations in intelligence that may help identify suspicious facilities, and 
limitations of the national strategy of the country.  
 
Treverton, Gregory F.  (2001).  Reshaping National Intelligence in an Age of 
Information.  New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
The world of intelligence has been completely transformed by the end of the Cold 
War and the onset of an age of information. Prior to the 1990s, US government 
intelligence had one principal target, [but] today, world intelligence has many 
targets, numerous consumers, and too much information, most of which is not 
owned by the U.S. government and is of widely varying reliability. In this bold 
and penetrating study, Gregory Treverton offers his insider's views on how 
intelligence gathering and analysis must change. He suggests why intelligence 
needs to be both contrarian, leaning against the conventional wisdom, and 
attentive to the longer term, leaning against the growing shorter time horizons of 
Washington policy makers. He urges that the solving of intelligence puzzles tap 
expertise outside government - in the academy, think tanks, and Wall Street - to 
make these parties colleagues and co-consumers of intelligence, befitting the 
changed role of government from doer to convener, mediator, and coalition-
builder (www.amazon.com). 
 
Turner, Michael A.  (2005).  Why Secret Intelligence Fails.  Dulles, VA: Potomac 
Books. 
 
Michael Turner argues that the root causes of failures in American intelligence 
can be found in the way it is organized and in the intelligence process itself. 
Intelligence that has gone awry affects national decision making and, ultimately, 
American national security. Intelligence officials are reluctant to talk about 
intelligence successes, claiming "the secret of our success is the secret of our 
success." But these officials also shy away from talking about failures, largely 
because doing so would expose the failings of American intelligence and have an 
impact on policy consumers who may become more reluctant to accept and act on 
the intelligence they receive. 
 
Rather than focusing on case studies, the book takes a holistic approach, 
beginning with structural issues and all dysfunctions that emanate from them. 
Turner explores each step of the intelligence cycle—priority setting, intelligence 
collection, analysis, production, and dissemination—to identify the "inflection 
points" within each stage that contribute to intelligence failures. Finally, he 
examines a variety of plans that, if implemented, would reduce the likelihood of 
intelligence failures. 
 
While examining the causes of intelligence failures, Turner also explores 
intelligence as a critical governmental activity, making the book an excellent 
primer on secret intelligence. Turner writes in jargon-free prose for the informed 
reader interested in foreign policy and national security policy matters and brings 
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enough depth to his subject that even experts will find this a must-read. (Synopsis 
from Amazon.com) 
 
United States.  Aspin-Brown Commission, Preparing for the 21st Century.  
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (1996). 
 
The Report of the Aspin/Brown Commission made a number of recommendations 
regarding the organization of the Intelligence Community.  Structural changes in 
the NSC staff were proposed to enhance the guidance provided to intelligence 
agencies. Global crime — terrorism, international drug trafficking, proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, and international organized crime — was given 
special attention with recommendations for an NSC Committee on Global Crime. 
The Commission also recommended designating the Attorney General to 
coordinate the “nation’s law enforcement response to global crime,” and 
clarifying the authority of intelligence agencies to collect information concerning 
foreign persons abroad for law enforcement purposes. It urged that the sharing of 
relevant information between the law enforcement and intelligence communities 
be expanded, and their activities overseas be better coordinated. (Congressional 
Research Service) 
 
United States.  (2004).  The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.  New York, NY: W. 
W. Norton & Co. 
 
The result of months of intensive investigations and inquiries by a specially 
appointed bipartisan panel, The 9/11 Commission Report is one of the most 
important historical documents of the modern era. And while that fact alone 
makes it worth owning, it is also a chilling and valuable piece of nonfiction: a 
comprehensive and alarming look at one of the biggest intelligence failures in 
history and the events that led up to it. The commission traces the roots of al-
Qaeda's strategies along with the emergence of the 19 hijackers and how they 
entered the United States and boarded airplanes. It details the missed 
opportunities of law enforcement officials to avert disaster. Using transcripts of 
cockpit voice recordings, the report describes events on board the planes along 
with the chaotic reaction on the ground from nearly every level of government. 
Going forward, the commission calls for a comprehensive overhaul of what it sees 
as a deeply flawed and disjointed intelligence-gathering operation. The creation of 
a post for a single National Security Director is recommended, along with the 
creation of a National Counterterrorism Center. The report finds fault with the 
approaches of both the Clinton and Bush administrations but, because they were a 
bipartisan panel and the problems described are so systemic and far-reaching, they 
stop short of assigning blame to any particular person or group. Credit must be 
given to how readable the report is. At more than 500 pages, the writing is clear 
and forceful and the information is made more accessible since it is free from 
election politics and rancor. While the commission notes that future attacks are 
probably inevitable, a coordinated preventive effort along with a clear plan to 
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respond with efficiency can offer Americans some hope in a post-9/11 world. 
(Synopsis from Amazon.com) 
 
United States.  General Accounting Office. Defense Acquisitions:  Steps Needed to 
Ensure Interoperability of Systems That Process Intelligence Data.  Report 
to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.  
Washington, DC: GAO, 2003. 
 
Making sure systems can work effectively together (interoperability) has been a 
key problem for the Department of Defense (DOD) yet integral to its goals for 
enhancing joint operations.  Given the importance of being able to share 
intelligence data quickly, [the GAO] assessed DOD’s initiative to develop a 
common ground-surface-based intelligence system and to particularly examine (1) 
whether DOD has adequately planned this initiative and (2) whether its process 
for testing and certifying the interoperability of new systems is working 
effectively. 
 
GAO recommends that DOD enhance its planning to include a detailed migration 
plan and schedule.  GAO also recommends that DOD take steps needed to enforce 
its process and determine why the services are slow to certify systems in order 
that it can implement controls and incentives needed to spur compliance.  DOD 
generally agreed with GAO recommendations (GAO). 
 
 
U.S. Senate. Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence 
Assessments on Iraq.  S. Rpt. 108-301, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 2004. 
 
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's Report on the U.S. Intelligence 
Community's Prewar Assessments on Iraq is intended to provide the Senate and 
the American public with a substantial record of the facts underlying the 
conclusions of the Committee regarding the intelligence community's prewar 
assessments of Iraq's programs for weapons of mass destruction and its ties to 
terrorism. 
 
Waltz, Edward.  (2003).  Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise.  
Norwood, MA: Artech House. 
 
Written for professionals who are responsible for the management of an 
intelligence enterprise operation in either the military or corporate setting, this is 
the first easy-to-understand, system-level book that specifically applies 
knowledge management principles, practices and technologies to the intelligence 
domain. 
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Watanabe, Frank.  (1997).  “Fifteen Axioms for Intelligence Analysts: How to 
Succeed in the DI.”  Studies in Intelligence (Unclassified Edition), No. 1. 
 
 From the Author: Before leaving the DI on a rotational assignment, I endeavored 
to set down some of the axioms by which I have tried to live in my career. 
Initially, this exercise was begun to provide some practical advice to a new 
analyst joining my branch, but I eventually decided that these axioms might be of 
interest to officers throughout the DI. Although I have not rigidly adhered to 
them, they have served me well as general guides to professional conduct as a DI 
analyst. To experienced analysts, many of the principles will sound like truisms 
and, if that is the case, all the better. I just tried to codify general rules that guide 
what we in the DI do on a daily basis, and I would not presume to invent new 
tradecraft. But the new DI analyst, and more than a few old hands, would be well 
served by remembering these 15 principles in their everyday conduct, as I suspect 
that many will never be adopted officially. 
 
Ward, Steven.  (2002).  “Counterpoint to ‘The Coming Revolution in Intelligence 
Analysis’: Evolution Beats Revolution in Analysis.”  Studies in Intelligence, 
46(3): 29-36. 
 
At its heart, “The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis” is criticizing the 
DI’s office-based culture.  Many would argue that the problem is that the current 
model for analysis has not been applied consistently across the Directorate. Many 
of the shortcomings that Medina lists are the result of this uneven application and 
the failure to solidify the corporate foundation of basic tradecraft skills. 
Successful change in any organization requires either a dramatic and widely 
accepted shift in basic principles or years of sustained attention to shaping 
processes and values. In both cases, senior leadership needs to demonstrate what 
it truly values by using the full gamut of its abilities to promote and reward the 
desired behaviors.  
 
Rather than trying to jumpstart the process of altering the Directorate’s office-
based culture with another round of disruptive changes, the DI would be better 
served by continuing to seek improvements at the margins. Some Issue Groups 
and Teams have shown that it is possible to achieve an optimal balance between 
the attention they pay to current developments and customer service, between 
building analysts’ skills and providing timely and valuable responses to 
policymakers, and between maintaining their analytic integrity and tailoring 
support to meet policymakers’ needs. In short, we know what needs to be done 
and how to do it. The challenge is for our senior leadership to show through its 
actions that to achieve the most ambitious goals of responsiveness and relevance 
across the Directorate it will enforce a high corporate tradecraft standard and 
solidify our foundation of analytic and managerial skills through training, 
opportunity, and accountability. 
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